The community and the individual in the later philosophy of Josiah Royce. by Sprague, Wayne Llewellyn Carlyle
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1953
The community and the individual
in the later philosophy of Josiah
Royce.
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/9534
Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
GRADUATE SCHOOL 
DISSERTATION 
THE COMMUNITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE LATER 
PHILOSOPHY OF JOSIAH ROYCE 
by 
WAYNE LLEWELLYN CARLYL.E SPRAGUE 
{A . B. , College of Puget Sound, 1933) 
submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the de gre e of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
1953 
First Reader 
Second Reader 
---1 ·-;··. 
l"' .1 _!) 
;7 S 3 
s p t "' 
. . . 
I 
Approved 
by 
'• ?.1.~01$~7//1. . 0 • 0 • • • • 
Professor o~Sy~tematic Theology 
0 • -r~ ~ . ~· .. 0 0 • 0 • 0 
Professor of Philosophy 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 
I. INTRODUCTION •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
1. Statement of purpose •• . . . . . . . . . . . 
2. Primary and secondary sources. • • • • • • • • 
3. Previous related work. . . . . • • • • • • • • 
4. Definiti on of the term community •• • • • • • 
II. A SURVEY OF THE LIFE AND PHILOSOPriT OF ROYCE. • • 
III. 
1. Royce as a man ••••••••• • iJ • • • • • • 
2. Royce's earlier philosophic relations. • • • • 
3. Royce's early system of philosophy • • • • • • 
i. Epistemology •••• • • • • • • • • • • • • 
ii. Metaphysics ••••••••••• • • • • • 
iii. Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
THE GENESIS AND DEVELOPAffiNT OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL AND THE COMMUNITY . • • • • 
1. The status of the individual in the 
earlier Royce. • . • • . • . . . . . . • 
2. The empirical fact of social pluralism . 
3. The empirical fact of social monism. . • 
4. Synthesis of social pluralism and 
monism in the concept of the community • 
i. Ideal self-extension (interpretation) 
is the basic process in the creation 
of the community •••••••••• 
• • • 
. 
• . • 
. • • 
• • • 
. . . 
iii. 
PAGE 
1 
1 
6 
7 
12 
15 
15 
18 
23 
23 
25 
28 
30 
30 
36 
37 
39 
41 
CHAPTER 
ii. The community is an emergent social 
mind: social realism • • • • • • • • • • • 
iv. 
PAGE 
51 
iii. Organic pluralism • • • • • • • • • • • • • 57 
IV. THE LOGICAL AND JtilETAPHYSICAIJ ASPECTS OF THE 
COMMUNITY AND THE INDIVIDUAIJ • • • • • • • • • • 
1. Interpretation as the logical basis of 
the cmnmunity and the individual ••• • • • 
i. Limitation of perception, conception, 
and in tuition • • • • • • • • • • • • 
ii. IGnowledge as mediative, triadic, 
• • • 
and social •••••••••••• . . . . . 
2. The Community of Interpretation •• . . 
3. The elevation of the status of the individual 
64 
64 
65 
67 
75 
in the philosophy of the community. • • • • • s•2 
i. Interpretation as the logical basis for 
individuality • • • • • • • • • • • . . 
ii. The Community of Interpretation as 
essentially social •••••••••• 
iii. The relation of the finite to value • 
• • • 
• • • 
iv. Increased empiricism ••• . . . . . . . 
82 
87 
91 
95 
v. Increased significance of the individual •• 103 
4. Personalistic organic pluralism • • • • • • • 108 
V. THE RELATION OF THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMUNI TY TO 
THE ETHICAL AND REIJIGIOUS LIFE OF THE INDIVIDUAL 115 
1. The nature of loyalty ••• . . . . . . . . . 115 
2. Loyalty to the community is more concrete 
and personal than loyalty to the Absolute •• 117 
3. Provincial loyalty and the finite community • 125 
4 . The religious basis for the community. • • • 129 
v. 
CHAPTER PAGE 
' 
5. The contrast in Royce's development 
in religious thought • • • • • • • . . • • 134 
134 i. Theistic humanism • • . . . . . . . . . . . 
ii. The immortal Beloved Co~nunity . . . 
VI. CONCLUSION AND ESTIMATE ••• . . . . . 
•• 138 
• 140 . . 
BIBLIOGRAPHY • . . . . . . . . . . 146 
ABS THACT • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • 158 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY •• . . . . . . . . • • • 164 
C H A P T E R 0 N E 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Statement of purpose. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate 
the changes in Josiah Royce's philosophic development from 
the earlier concept of the Absolute to the later concept of 
the Co~nunity. Special reference is made to the implications 
of this development with respect to the status of the indi-
vidual. 
One of the central problems with which Royce wre s tle d 
throughout his entire life was that of reconciling the unity 
of the universe with the independence of its constituent 
individuals. This fa c t may be observed in his writings . His 
most comprehensive metaphysical treatise, the Gifford Lec-
tures in two volumes, bears the t~tle, The World and the Indi-
vidual. Also, his last metaphysical writing, the two-volume 
Hibbert Lectures, although ca l led The Problem of Christi-
anity, is actually concerned predominantly with this same 
problem of the status of the individual. 
Royce's mature philosophic thought has been seriously 
neglecte d b y the traditional interpretations of Royce. They 
are based a lmost exc lusively on his earlier wri t ings. Hi s 
latest thought , however, constitutes a departure in many 
important respects from his earlier philosophy, as will appear 
i n the course of this dissertation. 
2. 
The period of Royce's development may be divided vari-
ously according to the purpose of the particular interpreter. 
For the present purpose, his philosophic development is sep-
arated into two periods. The earlier period is deffined as 
that before his exposition of those views that are peculiarly 
'related to the new reorientation of his philosophy around the 
concept of the 11 connnunity 11 • The later period is taken to in-
clude in general those introductions of new concepts especially 
foreshadowing the emerging view of the community. Specifically, 
the later view begins with the presentation of the transitional 
ideas of "loyalty" in The Philosophy of Loyalty in 1909 and 
certain further suggestions concerning loyalty and the view of 
"the real spiritual brotherhood of the loyal" as "a super-
1 human and not merely a human reality" in The Sources of Re-
ligious Insight _in 1912. Not until the Hibbert Lectures of 
1913, however, is there a full flowering of his concept of the 
"community" and its implications, which, according to the 
position of this dissertation,constitute significant changes 
in his views and a resulting body of novel contributions to the 
problem of our present study. 
A preliminary and general statement may be made concern-
ing the question of possibly significant changes in Royce's 
development. We may refer briefly to two sources for light on 
t~.s topic; Royce's own statements and those of some of his 
interpreters. 
1. Royce, SRI, 281. All references hereafter are to Royce 
unless otherwise noted. 
3. 
Royce states that his new rendering of his views is a 
"new mode of approach to the problems which ffie has7 formerly 
discussed. 111 And even though he qualifies this statement by 
saying that it is "simply a new mode of approach," it is 
apparent that definite changes in his views resulted from this 
"new mode." For example, he tells us in the Introduction to 
The Problem of Christianity, "there is much in it which I did 
not expect to say when I began the task here accomplished."2 
He adds, further, "as to certain metaphysical opinions stated 
in the second volume I now owe much more to our great and un-
duly neglected American logician, 1~. Charles Peirce, than I 
do to the common tradition of recent idealism ••• 113 Again, 
he says, "In spirit I believe my present book ,/The Problem of 
Christianity? to be in essential harmony with the bases of the 
4 philosophic idealism set forth in various earlier volumes." 
w. H. Werkmeister calls attention to the use of the phrase 
"in spirit" and adds, "Royce does not say even 'in basic con-
ception'."5 One might add further that Royce refers only to 
t he "bases'' of his earlier idealism and not to the structure 
of it,nor to the development of those bases. In a letter 
replying to Miss Calkins' view that The Problem of Christi-
anitX did not materially alter his philosophy Royce compli-
ments her on her interpretation of his earlier philosophy but 
1. POC, II, 205. 
2 • .POC, I, xi. 
3. Loc. cit. It should be observed here that Royce speaks of 
recent idealism and also that Peirce himself owes a great 
deal to Hegel. Cf. index to Peirce's Collected Papers. 
4. .POC, I, x. 
5. Werkmeister, HPIA, 165. 
4. 
protests her failure to recognize the changes in his views 
and insists that his book represents for him a "new light" 
and a "new experience" and contains "ideas which are as new 
to LEi~ as the ori ginal form of Lbi!J idealism was new to 
Lfu!!!7 when !JiiJ first defined it. 111 Also, in a letter 
written to Professor E. s. Brightman in 1913, Royce admits 
wlwt might safely be regarded as an increasing trend in the 
direction of Bowne's pluralistic personal idealism: 
I wish that somebody would tell me what my pre-
cise relation to Bovme is. I suppose that our agree-
ments were rather on the increase towards the end of 
his work. I always prized him much; but each of us 
had too many irons in the fire. I ou~ht to have 
come closer to him before he left us. 
Turning now to Royce's interpreters for information as 
to the nature of his philosophic development,it will be found 
that, although not in complete agreement as to details, most 
of them unite in the view that Royce's development was grad-
ual, and not characterized by marked changes. Among the 
most prominent of these writers are Mary W. Calkins, R. B. 
Perry, Woodbridge Riley, A. K. Rogers, H. w. Schneider, H. 
G. Townsend, and H. K. Wright. 
On the other hand, it is interesting to note that R. 
F. A. Hoernle in Idealism as a Philosophy classifies Royce 
as a "Spiritual Pluralist rather than as an Absolutist."3 
G. H. Howison also interprets Royce's latest philosophy as a 
"concrete and social idealism" and expresses the hope that this 
1. Art.(l916), 294. 
2. Royce, letter to E. s. Brightman, July 16, 1913. 
3. Hoernle, IP, x. 
5. 
new position is an indication in Royce of a change to "a 
1 primordially harmonic pluralism." Attention may be called 
also to G. w. Cunningham, who, in The Idealistic Argument in 
Recent British and American Philosophy, raises critical quest-
ions concerning the harmonizing of the earlier and later philo-
sophy of Royce. 
In his recently published book, A History of Philosoph-
ical Ideas in America {1949), W. H. Werkmeister argues for the 
position that there was a marked change in Royce's development. 
He calls it a "great reorientation of his philosophy."2 Then, 
after stating Royce's conception of the community and the in-
dividual, he goes on to say: 
If this is not in contradiction with ideas expressed 
by Royce in his earlier works, it is at least a radi-
cally new way of stating those ideas. 3Royce himself, I believe, took the more extreme view. 
The question of the degree of change in Royce's develop-
ment is mentioned here to indicate the relationship to previous 
work in the field and to indicate the need for an explicit in-
vestigation of this problem. The question of the amount of 
change in the development of a philosopher's views is, of 
course, sub:ject to the judgment of the individual interpreter 
as to what is essential and what is merely incidental in those 
views. It is sufficient at this point to recognize merely the 
use by Royce of different concepts and, in his own words, "a 
1. Howison, Art.{l916), 240. 
2. Werkmeister, HPIA, 164. 
3. Loc. Cit. 
I 
I 
I . 
I 
I 
6. 
new mode of approach"1 in his latest philosophy. The acknowl-
edged fact that Royce used different concepts in his later 
philosophy calls for a deliberate attempt to discover the 
meanings and implications of these concepts for his philoso-
phy. 
2. Primary and secondary sources. 
The primary source material for the subject of investi-
gation is abundant since Royce was a prolific writer. 
Benjamin Rand2 lists over six pages of bibliography consist-
ing of periodical articles, books, and introductions or fore-
words to other authors' books. Very few of these publications 
escape relevance to the subject of the present study. The 
Problem of Christianity, being the most comprehensive and 
systematic presentation of his second period, is, of course, 
the most pertinent to our problem. 
The secondary source material, including expositions 
and criticisms of Royce's philosophy in general, is likewise 
plentiful. The most important collection of these appears 
in The Philosophical Review of 1916 on the occasion of a 
meeting of the American Philosophical Association to celebrate 
Royce's sixtieth birthday. However, attention should be called 
to the reviews of his various books in periodicals as well as 
critical discussions of his position in many published books. 
1. POC, I, 295. 
2. Rand, Art.(l916). 
7. 
Material bearing specifically on Royce's later statements 
of his philosophy is, on the other hand, minimal. The 
"second period" of Royce's development, as has been stated 
above, attracted little attention. This was due probably, 
in part, to the early stereotyping of Royce and, in part, 
to the fact that his latest metaphysical views appeared 
under the possibly deceptive title, The Problem of Christi-
anity--deceptive, that is, in the sense that, despite the 
instances of The Religious Aspect of Philosophy and The Con-
. caption of God, many interpreter·s would not expect to find 
major metaphysical contributions under a religious title. 
3. Previous related work. 
Apart from incidental passages, the specific problem 
of the dissertation has not been developed in previous 
studies. The problem of the status of the individual in 
the earlier Royce, of course, has elicited much discussion. 
Chief among these may be counted the lectures of Joseph Le 
Conte, G. H. Howison, and Sidney E. Mazes in their debate 
with Royce as published in The Conception of God. Miss 
Calkins in The Persistent . Problems of Philosophy as well 
as James in his various letters to Royce and in his other 
writings, especially his Pluralistic Universe, have contri-
buted to the discussion. 
Jacob Loewenberg, in his introduction to Royce's 
Fugitive Essays, outlines briefly the development of Royce's 
s. 
philosophy but with the purpose of showing the relevance 
of his earliest essays to his latest thought and the simi-
larities between them. Although the position of this disser-
tation is in agreement that Royce's mature thought has its 
roots in his early thought, its chief purpose is to show the 
changes which took place and their resulting significance in 
Royce's attempt to give more place to the individual. Despite 
the fact that Loewenberg gives due recognition to The Problem 
of Christianity by designating it and The World and the Indi-
vidual, as "his magna opera,"1 he, nevertheless, overlooks 
the novel element in the later work. An example of this over-
sight is his insistence that the Absolute and the Universal 
Community are "identical."2 This identification does not 
allow sufficiently for the important diffe~ences between these 
two concepts as they are employed by Royce. 
Werkmeister 1 s 3 summary of Royce's philosophic develop-
ment is related to this dissertation in that he indicates 
the "reorientation" of Royce's philosophy around the idea of 
the community. However, he devotes only four pages to the 
central ideas of the community and fails to indicate the bear-
ing of this new concept on the place of the individual. 
John E. Smith's recent book on Royce's Social Infinite 
1. Loewenberg, FE, 10. 
2. Ibid., 12. 
3. Werkmeister, HPIA, 133-168. 
gives recognition to the importance of Royce's view of the 
Community. However, its scope is different from that of 
this dissertation in that its discussion is limited to the 
9. 
Universal Community and develops neither the historical 
changes in Royce's views nor the special problem of changes 
in the status of the individual. Smith's chief emphases are: 
the analysis of the Community of Interpretation, its roots 
in Peirce end DeMorgan, and the specific "problems of Chris-
tianity." 
The most recent publications on Royce's philosophy are 
two collections of selected writings edited by Stuart G. 
Brown entitled, The Social Philosophy of Josiah Royce and 
The Religious Philosophy of Josiah Royce. Although some 
consideration is given to Royce's doctrines of interpretation 
and the Community in the introductory essay to the first book, 
there are, significantly, no selections from The Problem of 
Christianity in the body of the text. And, a,lthough there 
are selections from The Problem of Christianity in the sec-
ond book, there is no discussion in the introductory essay 
as to any significant change in Royce's social or metaphys-
ical theory. 
Only two doctor's dissertations are known to be rele-
vant: 
Joseph Howard Philp, The Princi le of Individuation in the 
Philosophy of Josiah Royce. Yale University, 916. 
Privately printedJ~ 
Paul E. Johnson, Josiah Royce's Philosophy of Religion. 
(Boston University, 1928). 
10. 
Although the first of these -shows ability, it con-
siders seriously only the earlier Royce. Mr. Philp does 
hint at a marked change in Royce's latest views but curi- -
ously rejects from consideration Royce's latest position 
as being inconsistent with the earlier Absolute and his 
apparent love for unity. He proceeds, then, to a criticism 
of Royce's earlier attempts to harmonize the Absolute and 
the individual and finds that Royce fails in his purpose. 
Since Philp's work borders on the problem of this disser-
tation, it may be proper to quote his summary of conclu-
sions in its entirety: 
I. The existence of the Absolute, I have contended, 
has not been proved by Royce·. Hence the individuation 
traced to · the thought or will of the Absolute hangs in 
the air. 
It is contended further that the finite -individual 
is defined throughout in terms of 'content'. This 
'content' is hypostatised as the individual. The union 
of 'consciousness' with its content is tak~n as the 
union of thought with the actual objects of the real 
world. The terms 'self' and 'experience' are also 
abstractions of the intellect. The only change seems 
to be that the latter term with 'will' marks a change 
of the 'content' from static to dynamic terms, from 
thought to thinking. Will, despite its relation, as 
stated, to desire, is but a clearly defined purpose, 
an intention to act, and hence is intellectual and 
abstract. 'Interpretation' also is ideal construction. 
No definition or description of the individual in 
terms of the 'content' of consciousness can give us 
reality as it is. Hence such an approach to the nature 
of individuality casts little or no light upon that 
nature. 
II. The theory of an Absolute and a defining of the 
individual in terms of intellectual content going hand 
in hand, I have traced to this untenable view the 
11. 
defining of the moral ideal in terms which portray 
a vicarious or self alienating principle. The mere 
unity of consciousness and of ideal constructions is 
not adequate to the facts of real life. In the human 
individual, life is seen issuing from springs of desire 
and impulse and these, as well as explicit reflective 
consciousness, I regard as personal. The genius of 
community is harmonioys differentiation of interest, 
not mere unification. 
All of these conclusions, where relevant, differ from 
the conclusions that have been reached in this dissertation. 
As is evident from the quotations, 1~. Philp deals almost 
exclusively with the earlier Royce. Also, his work impresses 
one as unsympathetic and externally critical from the point 
of view of ethical naturalism and pragmatism. 
Johnson, in his dissertation on Royce's philosophy of 
religion, naturally deals with the problem of the religious 
status of the individual and the nature of God. But here, 
too, there is inadequate recognition of the significance of 
the new concepts introduced by the mature Royce. To cite 
only one example, Johnson treats the later concept of finite 
individual selves' being members of a community Self as 
identical with finite selves' being parts of an Absolute 
Self. 
Royce believes that his principle of individuality 
saves the integrity of the finite self. But any philo-
sophy that makes finite selves parts of an Absolute 
Self endangers either the finite or the Absolute self-
hood. He preserves the unity of the Absolute Self by 
fusion of finite selves there-in, which an1ounts to 
1. Philp, PIPJR, 91-92. 
confessing that the identity and distinctness of 
finite individuals is not ultimately real. 
All of these internal inconsistencies arise in 
striving after an absolute Wlity that makes ail 
things and selves parts of the one real Self. 
12. 
It should be stated, however, that there can be a signif-
icant difference between the relation of "parts of" and 
"membership in." But Johnson assumes these relations to 
be identical without raising the question of a possible 
dissimilarity. This same comment applies to his assump-
tion of the identity of the concepts of God, the Absolute, 
and the Community. 2 
4. Definition of the term Community. 
Since an essential part of our study is the defini-
tion of the concept of the community, no more than a prelim-
inary definition is possible here. 
It should be pointed out that Royce occasionally uses 
the term "community" in a popular, non-technical sense equiv-
alent in meaning to a particular localized society or soci-
ety in general. Such usage is found as early as his first 
philosophic book, The Religious AsQect of Philosophy. 3 It 
is not until the Problem of Christianity that he develops 
the technical usage employed in this study. 
There are several levels of community life, according 
to the latest Royce. But a basic classification of types 
1. Johnson, JRPR, 210. 
2. Jor~son, JRPR, 97. 
3. RAP, 211. 
13. 
may distinguish between limited communities and the Uni-
versal Community. It is difficult, without detailed qual-
ifications, to formulate a definition that is applicable to 
both these general types. Royce himself never gives a spe-
cific general definition. The limited communities may be 
defined as ttpersonaln group minds1 created by individual 
selves who ideally extend their lives to include entities 
shared in common in the time-order. This definition can 
apply to the Universal Community with two reservations. 
First, the Universal Community is the more immediately a 
resultant of the interaction of co~nunity selves rather 
than of individual selves. Second, the Universal Community, 
unlike the limited communities, has a type of being that is 
not so exclusively the product of social evolution. 
A problem arises concerning capitalization of the term 
community, (meaning the Universal Community), since Royce's 
usage is inconsistent. Royce is consistent, however, in 
using the definite article "the" when referring to the Uni-
versal Community of Interpretation. In the interest of 
clarity and consistency the practice in this dissertation 
will conform to Royce's usage when he is clearly deliberate, 
1. An adequate definition of this key concept must await the 
discussion of the development of the finite communities 
in the third chapter and of "interpretation" in the 
fourth. The social minds are essentially "communities of 
interpretation". 
14. 
which is to use the lower case in referring to limited or 
finite communities and capitalization in referring to the 
Universal Community. The Religious or Beloved Community 
will always be explicitly designated as such. Royce fre-
quently uses the term community in its popular sense even 
in The Problem of Christianity. For such non-technical 
usage synon~ns such as society, social group, and the like, 
will be substituted in discussion of Royce. 
Such expressions as the finite self, the social mind, 
individuation, unity, the relations of a part to its whole, 
and membership in another self cannot yet be defined since 
part of the task of the dissertation is to clarify these 
concepts. 
The discussion that follows will attempt to show, 
first, the meaning of these central ideas in Royce's earller 
period and then to portray the newer views of both the self 
and the community developed in the latest period along with 
their logical and metaphysical bases. Finally, the meaning 
of his latest ethical and religious concepts will be defined 
in terms of their implications for the problem of the status 
of the individual. 
C H A P T E R T W 0 
A SURVEY OF THE LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY OF ROYCE 
1. Royce as a man. 
Josiah Royce was born in Grass Valley, Nevada County, 
California, November 20th, 1855. He received no formal 
education outside his mother's teaching unt:i.l the age of 
eleven. His college training lacked a specific course in 
philosophy, a _fact which w. K. Wright facetiously points 
to as a possible explanation of his life-long interest in 
the subject.1 However, he professed a "really very great 
and deep effectn produced upon him by the teaching of Pro-
feasor Joseph LeConte, a pioneer Darwinian with a religious 
and metaphysical orientation. 2 In 1875 he received his 
A. B. degree from the University of California. During 
the next year, while in Germany, he came under the influence 
of idealism both through the lectures of Lotze, Wundt, and 
Windelband and the reading of Kant. After two further years 
of study at Johns Hopkins and upon submitting a dissertation 
on the Interdependence of the Principles of Knowledge, Royce 
received the Ph.D. degree from Johns Hopkins University in 
1878. Except for the following four years, which were spent 
in the teaching of English at the University of California, 
1 • . Wright, H!lli>, 486. 
2. HGC, 128. 
16. 
Royce taught philosophy at Harvard. There, as an expo-
nent of post-Kantian Idealism, he became after the death 
of James, according to R. B. Perry, "the most influential 
American philosopher. 111 In 1914 Royce succeeded G. H. 
Palmer in the Alford Professorship of Natural Religion, 
Moral Philosophy and Civil Polity--a chair which he occu-
pied until his death, September 14, 1916. 
Royce believed himself as a boy to be disagreeably 
conspicuous because he was "red-headed, freckled, countri-
fied, quaint, and unable to · play boys 1 · games. 112 He was 
always slight in build, youthful in appearance and lacking 
in muscular development. In later life his general bearing 
and large dome-like head immediately marked him out as a 
philosopher. James, in comraenting on Royce's appearance, 
said that he had an "indecent exposure of the forehead." 3 
Royce, according to his own account, carried through-
out his life a tendency to "social ineffectiveness rt and 
11 timidi ty" and was always 11 a good deal of a non-conformist. 114 
The contrast between his practical life and his theoretical 
emphasis on the community suggests the possibility that the 
latter may be at least partially a compensation for his 
psychological inadequacies. 5 
1. Perry, DAB, 210. 4. HGC, 130. 
2. HGC, 126-127. 5. Cf. infra, 143. 
3. Santayana, COUS, 97. 
17. 
Characteristic of Royce was his breadth of mind, 
his originality of insight, and his earnestness and rever-
ence. Besides a dialectical and analytical skill, Royce 
had a sense of humor and a sympathy that enabled him to 
acknowledge the truth in the arguments of his severest 
critics. This latter trait helped to make him respected 
and loved as a teacher. 
His writings were voluminous, and although expressed 
with dignity and clarity, were repetitious and verbose. 
Of this failing he was quite aware, confessing in his diary 
of 1883, "As usual I spin out the business a trifle too · 
1 long." Royce's colorful style reveals his genius in con-
ceiving apt illustrations, which penetrate to the heart of 
complex problems and portray the basic issues in simple 
clarity. In praise of the "moral beauty" of Royce's writ-
ings, Loewenberg asserts that the word "nobility" is the 
only one adequate to describe his style~ 2 Royce was a 
popular lecturer, holding for long periods the attention of 
audiences, a fair proportion of which could not possibly 
have been able to grasp the complex developments of his thought. 
He was invited to deliver lectures at both Aberdeen and Oxford 
--lectures which were later published in two volumes each, 
1. Perry, DAS, 211. 
2. Loewenberg, FE, 5. 
appearing respectively under the titles, The World and 
the Individual and The Pr.oblem of Christianity. 
2. Royce's earlier philosophic relations. 
18. 
Royce's earlier philosophic relations are suggested 
1 by his adherence to the post-Kantian idealistic tradition. 
Most influential besides Kant were Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, 
Schopenhauer, and Lotze. Royce felt most of all his debt to 
Kant, 2 having "long paid a great deal of attention" to his 
philosophy. 3 However, he departed from it in significant 
ways, e. g., in rejecting the Kantian Dualism and the un-
knowable Dinge-an-sich. In addition to a slight influence 
by the metaphysics of the Critique of Pure Reason, the 
primacy of the practical reason influenced Royce greatly. 
Royce derived much from Fichte's ethical-religious idealism 
with its emphasis upon activity and will. He writes, "he 
!J..oycg lmows how much he . has gained from Fichte. n4 The 
blending of Leibnizian Monadology with Spinozistic panthe-
ism as found in Schelling left its marks on Royce's thought. 
Royce admitted also a great indebtedness to Hegel5 though 
he protested that he could not "call himself an Hegelian."6 
1. RAP, ix. 4. RAP, ix. 
2. RAP, ix. 5. RAP, ix. 
3. HGC, 129. 6. RAP, ix-x. 
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In f'act, in 1913 _. he endorsed a statement i:nade by a review-
er of his Spirit of Modern Philosoph~ in 1892 that in this 
book he "came nearer to being a follower of Schopenhauer 
1 than a disciple of Hegel." He adds further, "I have never, 
since then, been more of an Hegelian tha,n at that time I 
was. I am now Lin 191~ less so than ever before."2 Most 
students of philosophy would find little basis for Royce's 
denial of his being an Hegelian, at least in his earlier 
philosophy, and would feel that there was an analogy here 
to Bowne's oversight of' his debt to Lotze. In his latest 
period, however, there would seem to be justification in 
Royce's protest to the continuation of such designating of 
his philosophy. In the introduction to his Problem of 
Christianity he says: 
It is time, I thinl<:, that the long customary, but 
unjust and loose usage of the adjective "Hegelian" 
should be dropped. The genuinely Hegelian views were 
the ones stated by Hegel himself, and by his early 
followers. My own interpretation of Christianity, in 
these volrunes, despite certain agreements with the 
classical Hegelian theses, differs from that of' Hegel, 
and of the classical Hegelian school, in important ways 
which I can, with a clear conscience, all the more vigor-
ously emphasize, just because I have, all my life, endeav-
ored to treat Hegel both with careful historical justice 
and with genuine appreciation. In fact the present is 
a distincSly new interpretation of the 'Problem of Chris-
tianity'. 
With respect to Schopenhauer, there could be no ques-
tion that he exercised a great influence on Royce's thought; 
1. POC, I, xii. 
2. POC, I, xii. 
3. POC, I, xi-xii. 
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1 
Royce termed it "a very valuable influence." Schopen-
hauer's principal contribution was probably the emphasis 
upon the centrality of will. Royce's optimism was, of 
course, a definite point of divergence from the pessimism 
of Schopenhauer. Lotze was, likewise, according to Royce, 
"a very valuable" influence upon him, being "deeply influ-
ential both by his spoken words and by his writings. tt 2 
Royce confesses that after hearing Lotze in Germany, he 
"was for a while strongly under his influence."3 
The English idealists, of whom Green, Bradley, and 
Bosanquet were perhaps most important, can be mentioned as 
being distinctly related to Royce's development. He differed 
from them, in the main, through his view of the Absolute as 
a Self (Green excepted), his emphasis upon the integrity of 
the f i nite self, his acceptance of evolution, his tendency 
to Utilitarianism, and his more empirical methodology. His 
belief in evolution stemmed from the Romanticist movement 
and the philosophy of Spencer, his utilitarian tendency 
from the writings of John Stuart Mill. 
In America, Royce reflected the influence of the 
Calvinistic faith of New England Puritanism. His philosophy 
1. RAP, xi-xii. 
2. RAP, xii. 
3. HGC, 128. 
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also took a position between New England transcendentalism 
and the American revivers of ideali~m, including the St. 
Louis school of absolute idealism. 
The Calvinistic elements in Royce's early thought 
are revealed by his emphasis on God as the Absolute and 
man as finite, in error and ignorance, and lost apart from 
the grace of God. All evils are reconciled in God's Being. 
Royce revealed pietism in his firm faith in God's goodness 
and justice. 
Royce shared with the transcendentalists their romantic 
temper and disdain for science. Their stress on moral indi-
vidualism is reflected in Royce's concern for preserving the 
integrity of the individual. But for the most part Royce 
was in direct opposition to their extreme individualism and 
intuitionism. 
The practice of collectivistic settlements bears a 
relation to Royce's later emphasis on the community. And yet 
the underlying theory of individualism which permeated the 
transcendentalists' ventures was repugnant to Royce's stress 
on the ideal interdependence and unity of the individuals~ 
and the social group. 
In view of Royce's early experiences in lawless Cali-
fornia~ he could not share the transcendentalists' opposition 
to institutions and government. However, Royce in practice 
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showed a surprising aloofness toward both the church and 
state. 
Royce differed from Emerson in his love for the 
rational, logical, and metaphysical. Both made the Kantian 
distinction between understanding and reason. But, whereas 
Emerson debased practical reason to intuition, Royce, fol-
lowing Kant, regarded it as an ideal forn1 of reason. 
Emerson is found frequently, Royce seldom, in direct con-
flict with faith ·in the rational. 
Royce has much greater affinity with the St. Louis 
Hegelians. Both philosophies could be described as objec-
tive idealism. Both emphasized speculative philosophy and 
depended on logic as essential to knowing reality, thus 
differing from the transcendentalists' reliance and empha-
sis on intuition and also from the British empiricists' 
restrictions to psychology and biology. 
Royce was influenced throughout his life by William 
James, and, in his later development by Charles Peirce. 
As disciples of these philosophers he developed his prag-
matic and empirical strains. He differed from James largely 
through the absolutistic and rationalistic elements in his 
thought. Baldwin's views of the genetic development of the 
~elf and more specifically his theory of imitation left 
their marks on Royce's philosophy. 
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Although Royce, in turn, profoundly influenced his 
pupils and philosophic colleagues, the most curious fact 
remains that he won few converts to absolute idealism. 
Miss Mary w. Calkins and Professor H. H. Horne are the 
most outstanding disciples, perhaps the only ones. 
Hocking, though not an absolute idealist in the strict 
sense of the term, has been profoundly influenced by Royce. 
An explanation for this lack of disciples might lie in 
the nature of this period of thought which was marked, in 
part, by an upsurge of realism and pragmatism with their 
greater emphasis on analysis and pluralism and, in part, 
by the development of idealism e.g., personalism, in chan-
nels that were more empirical, pluralistic and harmonious 
with the growing scientific temper of the day. 
3. Royce's early system of philosophy. 
A.s a preliminary to a discussion of Royce's later 
philosophy a survey may be made of his earlier thought. 
The general structure of Royce's earlier system also pro-
vides a context or background for the development of his 
later view of the community. 
i. Epistemology. 
Royce's earlier epistemology is characterized by a 
blending of diverging views: rationalism and empiricism, 
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dualism and monism, internal and external meanings, rel-
ativism and absolutism, making and finding truth, and 
the roles of individual and social experience in knowing. 
Royce revealed his empirical temper both by grant-
ing that experienced data make up the largest part of our 
knowledge and by insisting that the coherence and compre-
hensiveness of truth involve consistency with experience. 
His method, however, is also rationalistic. He affirmed 
with Leibniz and Kant, for example, the validity of a priori 
principles if they are presupposed in their own denial. 1 
By this method he derived, among other things, his proof 
for the truth of idealism. 2 
According to Royce, knowledge is empirically dual-
istic, but this knowledge is possible only through an ulti-
mate epistemic monism in the Absolute Knower. 
The idea, rather than being something separate from 
3 
the external world, actually implies it. Any act of know-
ing includes a purpose or internal meaning which refers 
beyond itself to an hypothetical fulfilment as an external 
purpose. It follows for Royce that 11 the idea is true if it 
possesses the sort of correspondence to its object that the 
4 idea itself wants to possess." 
Royce tried to fuse pragmatism and absolutism into 
1 
1. FE, 127; WI, I, 13; Art.(1913) • 
2. WI, I, 349. 
3. COG, 148. 
~. WI, 306; cf. 
ibid., 32. 
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what he termed 11 absolute pragmatism" or 11 absolute voluntar-
ism." Exemplifying this meeting of extremes, he held, on 
the one hand, "The most insignificant knowledge is in some 
1 
sense an original product of the man who lmows." On the 
other hand, he insisted, "I believe in the eternal. I am 
2 in quest of the eternal.~ Royce attempted to harmonize 
these two emphases by regarding the relativity of pragmatism 
as itself an absolute principle. The pragmatic elements in 
his epistemology are relativistic with reference to the 
social group, but are, at the same time, objective with ref-
erence to the individual. 
ii. Metaphysics. 
Royce's metaphysics grew out of his epistemology and 
became a solution to the epistemological problems. He 
opposed realism, mysticism, and critical rationalism as 
being inadequate definitions of reality. He argued that ide-
alism, particularly absolute idealism, was the most coherent 
view of reality and that the existence of an all-inclusive 
3 
self could be proved. In fact, as one proof, Royce insisted 
that the denial of such a being, itself referred to such a 
larger Self. 
Error and ignorance are possible only because the finite 
1. FE, 211; cf. RAP, 306, 322-323. 
Art.(1904), WJ, essay IV. 
2. Art.(l904), 123. 
3. WI, I, 538-554. 
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self is an organic member of the larger knower that includes 
both the knower and the known. "Being has • • • to be that 
object which makes ideas true or false."1 11The whole uni-
verse, including the physical world, also, is essentially 
one live thing, a mind, one great spirit."2 The chief' 
characteristic of this mind is will or purpose, the essen-
tial activity of which is to individuate or to particularize. 
As embodied will, the Absolute (reminiscent of the Fichtean 
interpretation) wills the world, differentiating itself into 
particular purposes, each being a unique and definite ful-
filment. In this way "both Thought and Experience reach 
determinateness of expression. 113 Each of these focal points 
of will or interest are finite selves. The Absolute is thus 
an Individual Whole of Individual Elements. 4 
This essentially vital universe in its inner life is 
the world of appreciation. As seen from the outside, how-
ever, it is the world of description. The outer physical 
world is an abstraction from the world of appreciation and 
consists of the qualities and relations that are easily meas-
ured, described, and thus communicated. This world of descrip-
tion is a social product, having order, universal law and 
permanence and "subject to categories" and mechanical cau-
5 
sation. 
1 • WI , I , 34 9 • 
2. SMP, 17. 
3. WI, I, 588. 
4. WI, I, 538. 
5. Sh~, 394-395; cf. 416. 
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Space, time, and the evolutionary processes belong also 
to this world. As a member of the world of description 
man is limited and determined, but as a member of the 
world of appreciation underlying the phenomenal world he 
is free and self-determined, sharing the freedom of the 
Absolute Self. 
The world of science is not an adequate basis for 
metaphysics; appreciation, on the other hand, gives us 
true insights into the nature of ultimate reality. 
1he relationship between these two worlds presents, 
of course, serious problems. Royce tried to solve most 
of them by giving priority to the world of appreciation, 
regarding the world of description as "simply an external 
as pect of the true and appreciable world. 111 
In Royce's view, the "whole, the Real World is the 
divine life. 112 The Absolute is a society of interacting 
persons, a society that is itself a personal being , or 
God. God is a person because he is self-conscious, eter-
nally perfecting himself through the etlrlcally si gnificant 
temporal processes of evolution and the linked activities 
of finite selves. 3 As an infinite Self, God is conscious 
of time and all temporal events but is himself not in time. 
The individual 'finite selves express or result from 
1. S:MP , 417. 
2. SGE, xi. 
3. WI, II, 419. 
28. 
God's will. They are free, though, Royce believed, because 
they express in their existence no will except their own. 1 
Their integrity is preserved not only in this life but also 
in the life to come. 2 Royce's view of this divine-human 
relationship may be summarized in his own words in which he 
says, "God cannot be One except by being Many . Nor can we 
various selves be Many, unless in Him we are One."3 
iii. Ethics. 
Royce's ethical system may -be classified as a modified 
formalism. Its basis is loyalty, the 11willing and practical 
and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause. 114 This 
might be interpreted as a teleological view if it were not 
for the fact that he insists that loyalty, even in its 
blindest forms, is an intrinsic, 5 a supreme6 good and serves 
in a fragmentary way the cause of universal loyalty.7 
Royce qualified his formalism by introducing the teleo-
8 logical factor of a rational or enlightened loyalty. This 
means that the cause we choose must be in a rational, self-
consistent and harmonious relationship with a system of 
. 9 
causes. This loyalty to loyalty is "the whole duty of man." 
1. WI, II, 331. 6. PL, 123. 
2. WI, II, 445-452. 7. PL, 375. 
3. WI, II, 331. 8. PL, 16. 
4. PL, 17. 9. PL, 140. 
5. RQ, 235. 
In Royce's words: 
My thesis is that all those duties which we have 
learned to recognize as the fundamental duties of 
the civilized man, the duties that every man owes 
to every man, are to be ri~htli interpre~ed as 
special instances_ of loyall Eo loyalty.-· 
The ethical ideal is further described as the 
achieving of an unified person or self which is a life 
2 
choosing and serving a cause in the s pirit of loyalty. 
Loyalty to loyalty provides such a single and unifying 
principle and thus satisfies the ethical ideal. 3 
1. PL, 139. 
2. PL, 98; cf. 168-169. 
3. PL, 170. 
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C H A P T E R T H R E E 
THE GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COMMUNITY 
1. The status of the individual in the earlier Royce. 
Throughout Royce's philosophic development there are 
certain constant views concerning the nature of the individ-
ual self and its relation to the world. On the other hand, 
his later views show certain changes both in emphasis and 
point of view. 
Some of the constant views of the self that recur in 
Royce's writings are: its non-substantiality in the scholastic 
sense, the fragmentariness of the present datum self, the time-
transcending nature of the true self, the organic relation of 
the self to the world, the activistic and teleological nature 
of the self, and the immoral character of ·the ethically iso-
1 lated self. 
The changes in Royce's later views are characterized by 
an emphasis on the social nature of the self with special 
reference to its social origin. Royce always held, at least 
implicitly, to a certain social nature of the self. This was 
true especially in the sense that the meaning of every self 
lay beyond itself. Also, the self was capable of social 
interaction. Even in his earlier stress on the all-engulfing 
1. J. Loewenberg, in his introduction to the Fugitive Essays 
By Josiah Royce, pp. 10-37, points out the presence of 
some of these features of Royce's views in his ea2liest 
writings. Cf. in Royce: RAP, 131-227; Art(l891) ; SGE; 
WI, II, 243ff; RQP; PL; WJ; SRI. Cf. infra, ch.5. 
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Absolute the individual selves were social in the sense 
that they were capable of knowing each other. Such knowl-
edge was defined by Royce as one part of the Absolute 
pointing to another part of itself. Later, under the influ-
ence of Baldwin, Royce added still another social attribute 
of the self when he stressed the self's interaction with 
others particularly in the process of imitation. It was 
through imitation, Royce believed, that the self establishes 
a basis for successful interaction, communication, and knowl-
edge of itself and other selves. So, although it could be 
said that Royce always held to the social nature of the self, 
there is still a ·marked difference in the meaning of the 
term social as applied to the self in the earlier and later 
Royce. In his earlier period the self was social in the 
sense that it was capable of social interaction and its 
status was due to its place in the context of the Absolute. 
In his later period, as will be seen below, the self becomes 
social in a new and very important sense--its social origin 
in the process of ideal self-interpretation. The mature 
self owes its constituent characteristics to this process of 
introjection of and identification with the processes and 
entities in its social environment. 
The changes in his conception of the self and its 
relation to the world were stimulated both by the objections 
of his critics and by Royce's own apparently growing dissat-
32. 
isfaction with his previous solutions to this problem. 
A brief survey of Royce's development will indicate his 
reorientation in the attempted solutions. 
The early Royce, with his more rationalistic empha sis, 
regarded the individual self as a thought of the Absolute 
Thinker. The problem of knowledge could be solved, according 
to Royce, 
only if there is a thought that includes both my thought 
and the object wherewith my thought is to agree. This 
inclusive thought must be related to my thought and its 
objects, as my thought is related to the various partial 
thoughts that it includes and1reduces to unity in any one of my complex assertions. 
Contained implicitly in this v:J:ew is: 
the assumption that all reality, spiritual and material, 
is present in its true nature to an all-embracing, 
intelligent thought, of w~ich mine is simply one sub-
ordinate part or element. 
This all-inclusive thought, according to Royce, is a personal 
Thinker or Knower3 and is the God, not of traditional theology, 
4 but of the 11 idealistic tradition from Plato downwards." 
In the Conception of God Royce broadens the ideal of 
an all-inclusive knower to that of a completely and perfectly 
5 
organized experience or experlencer, but "this Absolute Ex-
perience is related to our experience as an organic whole to 
its own fragments." 6 
In the debate that followed the presentation of these 
1. RAP, 377-378. 4. RAP, 476. 
2. RAP, 378. 5. COG, 36ff. 
3. RAP, 433-434. 6. COG, 44. 
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views, Howison charged, in part, that Royce's conception 
of the Absolute made human freedom and therefore ethical 
responsibility impossible. 1 Royce's rebuttal in the 
11Supplementary Essayu of the published lectures, advanced 
the view that individuation consisted in the satisfaction 
of an interest and that the freedom of each self is ulti-
2 
mately the freedom of the Absolute. Howison still felt 
that Royce's Absolute Reality was actually a ncontinuous 
Unity" rather than a "system of self-active beings forming 
3 
a Unity." 
Royce resumed his attempt to preserve the integrity 
of the individual in the World and the Individual. Here 
he expanded the teleological or organic view of the indi-
vidual self. In this view a self is a unique life-plan or 
purpose and is individual n ••• just precisely in so far 
4 
as !JiiE..7 life has this purpose and no other." It is God's 
5 
will that each self have a unique will. These wills God 
6 
or the Absolute includes as his own purposes. In answer 
to the objection that, by being included in the Absolute, 
the finite wills lose their freedom Royce replied that, on 
the contrary, they are by this fact guaranteed their free-
dom by sharing in the Absolute freedom. 
1. COG, 98-99. 4. WI, II, 276. 
2. COG, 258-265. 5. WI, II, 94. 
3. COG, xv. 6. WI, II, 330. 
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In terms of logic or meanings Royce regards the given 
self as a telic or internal meaning whose fulfilment or 
1 
external meaning is found in the Absolute life. In accord-
ance with Royce's type of idealism the true individual self 
of any man gets its final expression only in some form of 
consciousness different from that which he now has. "The 
real Self", according to Royce, is "what every real fact 
in the universe is: a Meaning embodied in a conscious life, 
present as a relative whole within the unity of the Absolute 
life. 112 In the "Supplementary Essay'' Royce defines the 
3 
Absolute as an "Individual Whole of Individual Elements." 
The chief immediate criticism of Royce's revision of 
his system appeared in reviews of the World and the Indi-
4 
vidual. J. E. McTaggart felt that the finite self was 
reduced in Royce's Absolute to a fleeting and transitory 
status analogous to that of the different conscious moments 
in the life of a finite individual. 5 John Dewey argued 
that if human experiences have no ultimate meaning and worth 
they cannot possibly be included as content in the Absolute. 
On the other hand, if they have ultimate meaning and worth 
the conception of the Absolute can be regarded only as the 
1. WI, II, 269. 
2. WI, II, 268. 
3. WI, I, 538. 
4. McTaggart, Art.(l900), 
258-266; Art.(l902), 
557-563. 
5. Dewey, Art.(l900), 311-
324; Art.(l902), 392-
407. 
best mode of expressing their meaning and thus cons titute 
a system of meaning which finite beings themselves construct 
or constitute. These two alternatives, Dewey believes, are 
1 
mutually exclusive or irreconcilable. c. M. Bakewell con-
cludes his · criticism of Royce's system with the assertion 
that the only way Royce could save the individual from com-
plate loss of identity in the Absolute would be to regard 
finite individuals as "eternally r eal and underived" and 
also as being on the same ontological plane with God. 
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to dupli-
cate the voluminous discussions and criticism of Royce's 
earlier period, notwithstanding the great philosophic value 
of this material. The problem of individuation in the early 
. 2 
Royce has been covered adequately already. The brief sur-
vey above is a selection of those arguments wn ich played the 
most important part in influencing the direction of Royce's 
latest reorientation of his philosophy around the new concepts 
of the individual and the community. 
There is a marked reversal of direction in Royce's 
latest attempt to solve the problem of the relation of the 
individual and the community. Royce throughout his life 
was essentially empirical in his approach to philosophical 
1. Bakewell, Art.(l901-2), 397-398. 
2. Besides references above, cf. Philp, PIJR. COG: 
Mazes, 53-64; Howison, 81-132. M:cTaggart, Art.(l900),; 
(1901). Calkins, PPP. 
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problems. But, whereas in his earlier period his procedure 
was to establish the e xistence of an Absolute first and 
then to struggle with the task of preserving the integrity 
of the finite individual, in his later period he starts 
with the uniqueness of the individual and then attempts to 
prove a type of unity in which individuals share a common 
1 life. 
2. The empirical fact of social pluralism. 
In holding to social pluralism Royce points for evi-
dence to the "practical commonsense experience" which leads 
everyone to be convinced of his uniqueness and separateness. 2 
This experience includes, for Royce, our immediate feelings, 
our conscious thoughts and purposes, as well as our wills 
and the deeds that express them. Also included are the 
ethical experiences of ideals, duties, responsibilities, 
praise and blame, ri gh t s, dignity, and inherent worth of all 
individual persons. These experiences individuate since 
they are not open to the direct experience of others. "These 
facts combine to show t hat the individual human selves are 
sundered by gaps which, as it would seem, are in some sense 
imp~ssable. 113 Apparent ly influenced by James, he says that 
individuals are "consti tuted" of "separate streams of feel-
ing,--of mutually inaccessible and essentially secret trains 
1. ~oc, II, 58. 
2. POC, II, 22. 
3. POC, II, 19. 
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1 
of ideas II They appear to resemble Leibnizian • • • • 
monads: nTheir only windows appeal ... to be those which 
their physical organisms supply."2 Royce's use of the 
word "appear", of course, is significant. In his previous 
view individual selves were empirically distinct. They 
were regarded as Leibnizian monads with windows opening 
3 
only to the Absolute. So, although appearing to be dis-
tinct, they were actually or metaphysically aspects of the 
unitary Absolute--" ••• but moments in his inclusive 
unity."4 However, the device for achieving some degree of 
unity of the many in the later Royce is no longer the Abso-
lute but rather the community. Therefore, whether indi-
viduation is appearance only, or, in some degree ultimate, 
depends upon the relationship of the individual to the 
finite community and, in turn, its relationship to the 
Community of communities. 
3. The empirical fact of social monism. 
Royce raised the question, given this empirical 
pluralism, whether individuals have in some way and to some 
extent something in common i.e. some entities which tran-
scend individuals and are shared by them. Is the appear-
ance and conviction of mutual distinctness countered by 
1. POC, II, 23. 3. SMP, 409-410. 
2. POC, II, 23. 4. SMP, 410. 
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other evidence of experiences shared by the individuals? 
To these questions Royce answered in the affirmative. 
First of all, Royce holds that strict atomism is 
refuted by the facts of social intercommunication. With-
out some common basis the exchange of meanings would be 
impossible. The knowledge of the world of description on 
the part of the individual depends, according to Royce, 
upon a social order and intercommunication, along with 
common agreements. I~ fact, even the "conception of ex-
1 
ternality itself" has social origins. Furthermore he 
holds that self-consciousness itself in its higher human 
forms likewise presupposes a body of interacting persons. 
For, without this companionship with other persons, Royce 
declares, "there is nothing to indicate that he La chil£7 
would become as self-conscious as is now a fairly educated 
2 
cat." Royce not only denies strict social atomism but 
also ascribes to the group a type of causal action in the 
process of developing the individual self. 
He goes a step further and asserts that in certain 
relationships individuals in groups appear as one being. 
These occasions may be represented by the instance of mob-
mindedness as is found frequently in lynchings, runs on 
banks, wars, political gatherings, and religious revivals. 
1. Art.(l894), 515. 
2. Art.(l894), 519. 
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Further instances of groups functioning as dynamic units 
are to be found in the development of a language or in 
the creation of customs, traditions, public opinion, and 
their resulting forces. Royce remarks that on such occa-
sions the rrstreams of consciousness ••• appear as if they 
had lost their banks altogether" and "seem to flow together 
like rivers that are lost in the ocean." 1 At such times 
the individuals as such do not appear to be thinking and 
acting but rather the group seems to be thinking and act-
2 ing through them. 
4. Synthesis of social pluralism and monism in the 9oncept 
of the community. 
On the one hand, there is, in Royce, the recognition 
that individuals are separated by apparently impassable 
chasms with a whole realm of thinking, feeling and acting 
shut up within the confines of their own selves. On the 
other hand, it is seen that these individuals do succeed 
apparently in transcending these chasms and in acting 
together as a unit in such a way that they are able to 
create a community. 
Royce faces here a fundamental problem of the self, 
namely, how the self can be monadic and at the same time 
1. POC, II, 28. 
2. POC, II, 29. 
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have meaningful interaction with other selves. Beginning 
with the Philosophy of Loyalty Royce no longer refers to 
an Absolute who differentiated himself into individual 
wills whose access to each other was through the mediation 
of the Absolute mind. 
The individual self in the later Royce has a social 
1 
origin. Influenced by J. M. Baldwin and Wilhelm Wundt, 
he explains the evolution of the self as being brought 
about by means of imitation and language and the interplay 
of a social group. The evoking of the same response in the 
individual and others gives the common content necessary 
for a community of meaning. Anticipating the discussion 
below, the process involved is that of interpretation. The 
gesture or symbolic activity of one individual is imitated 
by another~ In his response a social meaning arises. This 
is a triadic process of interpretation which constitutes a 
2 
comraunity of interpretation. 
By further analysis of the self Royce dealt with the 
problem of its organic structure. The process of develop-
ment of the complete human self, he concluded, involved 
ideal self-extension or interpretation. Out of this process 
1. POC, I, 363. "But this very doctrine ••• about the 
social origin of the individual self ••• 11 
2. Royce acknowledges Peirce as his source for this logical 
basis of his concept of the community. POC, II, 281-282. 
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emerges the community, which, following through the pro-
cess initiated by the individuals, becomes itself an or-
ganic self. 
i. Ideal self-extension (interpretation) is the basic 
process in the creation of the community. 
In Royce' s· view, the fragmentary, empirical self is 
all that one can find present to experience at any one 
time. The remainder which goes to make up the complete or 
coherent self must be inferred or interpreted. Vfhat he 
calls the present self is a life separated not only from 
its fellows but from i t s own past as well. This "merelv 
" 
present self" considered as such is "hardly a self at all," 
it is 11 just a flash of consciousness," a t1meaningless flow 
of feelings. 111 
From this position, Royce argues that the true, com-
plete self or personality must be regarded as including 
through temporal and social extension much more than is con-
tained in the present momentary self. 
Through temporal extension the individual reaches back 
to include within his true self those events which have pre-
determined his present self. Royce believes that the self's 
antecedents are in fact what help to constitute reflective 
self-consciousness and the idea of the subject on the part 
1. POC, II, 61. 
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of his fellows. The individual, then, using the present 
self as a basis, regards his whole life as including cer-
tain past events. This process, called "ideal temporal 
self-extension", in addition, establishes the primary 
basis for the community and the individual's life within 
it. 
There seem to be two distinguishable phases of the 
process involved in the extension of the self to the past. 
The first appears to be a process whereby the individual 
recognizes his actual antecedents, which might be regarded 
as causal determinants. These antecedents are the elements 
that are necessary to account for or to interpret the pres-
ent self. Royce makes an analogy to biological heritage to 
illustrate this point. He contends that just as a person 
recognizes his biological inheritance from his ancestors so 
may he also recognize the deeds of those ancestors as belong-
ing to himself, together with any events which he may regard 
as "predetermining the sense and destiny" which are now his. 
Our definition LOr the communiti7 presupposes 
_that there exist many individual selves. Suppose 
these selves to vary in their present experiences 
and purposes as widely as you will. Imagine them 
to be sundered from one another by such chasms of 
mutual mystery and independence as, in our natural 
social life, often seem helplessly to divide and 
secrete the inner world of each of us from the 
direct knowledge and estimate of his fellows. But 
let these selves be able to look beyond their present 
chaos of fleeting ideas and of warring desires, far 
away into the past whence they came, and into the 
future whither their hopes lead them. As they thus 
look, let each one of them ideally enlarge his own 
43. 
individual life, extending hims elf into the 
past and future, so as to say of some far-off 
event, belonging, perhaps, to other generations 
of men, 'I view that event as a part of my ovrn 
life.' 'That former happening or achievement 
so predetermined the sense and the destiny which 
are now mine, that I am moved to regard it as 
belonging to my own past.'l 
There is a second and more voluntary and creative 
phase of self-extension: an element is included that is 
not actually demanded for the completion of the wh ole 
self. The individual in this case desires self-enlarge-
ment as an expansion of the me aning and significance of 
his life. He therefore ident ifies his life vdth some 
past event which he may, but need not, personally remem-
ber. Royce main t a ins : 
The first condition upon which the existence 
of a communi ty, in our sense of the word, depends, 
is the power of an indi vidual self to extend hi s 
life, in ideal fashion, so as to regard i t as 
including past and future events which lie far 
away in time, and which he does not now personally 
remember. That this powel" exists, and tha t man has 
a self which is thus ideally extensible in time 
wl thout any definable limi t, we all know.2 
He goes on to ins i st tha t subjec t to r easonable self-imposed 
limits there is no restriction to this ideal s e l f-enlarge -
ment--certainly not an external restri cti on. 
All of us regard as belonging, even to our recent 
pa s t life , much that we cannot just now remember. 
No one can merely, from without, set for us the 
limits of the life of the self, and say to us: 
'Thus far and no farther.' In my ideal extensions 
of the life of the self, I am indeed sub.ject to 
1. POC, II, 58-59. 
2. POC, II, 60-61. 
• • 
some sort of control ••• I must be able to 
give myself some sort of reason, personal, or 
social, or moral, or religious, or metaphysical, 
for taking on or throwing off the burden, the 
joy, the grief, the guilt, the hope, the gloly 
of past and of future deeds and experiences. 
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In Royce's view, a connnunity emerges in the time-
process at this point. The individual who ideally extends 
himself to include a past event recognizes that event also 
as an included part of another person's ideally extended 
life. Many persons may thus "possess identically the same 
2 past." Ideal social extension of selves, a further act 
of self-extension, occurs in this interpenetration of the 
extended selves. Through mutually included events the 
individuals constitute themselves into a community. This 
ideal life in common Royce calls a "community of memory." 
Individuals, according to Royce, 
may be said to constitute a community with refer-
ence to that particular past or future event, or 
group of events, which each of them accepts or 
interprets as belonging to his own personal past 
or to his own individual future. A community 
constituted by the fact that each of its members 
accepts as part of his own individual life and 
self the same past events that each of his fellow-
members3accepts, may be called a communitx of 
memor-y:-. 
The preliminary step, in Royce, to the creation of 
a genuine present community is accomplished by individuals 
who create such a community of memory. The second step is 
1. POC, II, 61-62. 
2. POC, II, 44. 
3. POC, II, 50. 
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taken by these members of a community of memory who ide-
ally extend their lives to include future events, expected 
or hoped for. This future extension is again a matter of 
determining the true self, for an insistent point of 
Royce's is that the self is dependent on and is a product 
of a time-process. "The genuine person lives in the far 
off past and future as well as in the present. 111 When 
members of a community of memory mutually include identical 
future events and when they consciously regard these future 
events or fortunes of the group as being at the same time 
the future events or fortunes of their own lives they there-
by constitute a community of expectation or hope. 
A community constituted by the fact that each 
of its members accepts, as part of his own indi-
vidual life and self, the same expected future 
events that each of his fellows accepts, may be 
called a community of expectat~on, or upon 
occasion, a community of hope. 
Further, on the basis of these two steps individuals 
may create not only communities of memory and expectation 
but also commw1ities of the present. The memories and 
expectations held in common by the members of a group con-
stitute a basis for an "unquestionable consciousness of 
unity113 and on the basis of this unity of the past and 
future the community of the present is built. 
Thus, then, common memory and common hope, 
the central possessions of the community, tend, 
when enlivened by love, to mould the consciousness 
1. POC, II, 67. 
2. POC, II, 51. 
3. POC, II, 79. 
of the present, and to link each member to his 
community by ideal ties which belong to the 
moment as well as to the stream of past and 
future life.l 
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The indispensable and most basic requisite for the 
establishing of a community of the present, for Royce, is 
this ability of the constituent individuals to extend 
themselves ideally in time. 2 For, as in the case of the 
individual, the community needs extension in the time-
process to realize its true nature. It can no more have 
significant existence in the mere present than can the 
individual. In Royce's words: 
The rule that time is needed for the formation 
of a conscious community is a rule which finds 
its extremely familiar analogy within the life 
of every individual human self. Each one of us 
knows that he just now, at this instant, cannot 
find more than a mere fragment of himself present. 
The self comes down to ~s from its own past. It 
needs and is a history. 
Those individuals then, who have a unity with reference to 
a mutually shared identical past and future may extend this 
co~non life to the present by ideal social extension of 
their lives in the present. This extension is accomplished 
by means of co-operation and love. In his view, these 
two processes, although variable and antithetical, as will 
be explained presently, are, nevertheless, complementary. 
They are both necessary to the construction and perpet-
uation of the community, even though in different ways. 
1. POC, II, 95. 
2. POC, II, 69. 
3. POC, II, 40. 
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Royce here combines the active (co-operation) and the 
passive (love) and their respective pluralizing and 
singularizing processes. Although, in Royce's view, 
deeds or events of the past and future shared by a group 
of individuals is the indispensable basis for their unity 
in a community, they are, according to Royce, too infre-
quent to create or maintain a community of the present. 
If individuals are to succeed in forming such a co~nunity 
they must co-operate in present deeds. Involved in Royce's 
idea of co-operation is the requirement that the individual 
must recognize that the co-operative deed is a part of his 
life, that it is the inner expression of the ideals of his 
life (as in the case of the artist), that the deed be 
directed by the individuals, that the individuals observe 
the contributions of their fellows, and that the individ-
uals realize that without just this co-operative combi-
1 
nation the deed in question could not be accomplished. 
Co-operation is essential to Royce's view of the 
community because the individual's perpetual effort in co-
operation preserves his individuality in the cormnunity life. 
In brief: We thus seem to be individuated by our 
deeds. The will whereby I choose my ovm deed, is 
not my neighbor's will. My act is my own. Another 
man can perform an act which re peats the type of 
my act, or which helps or hinders my act. But if 
the question arises concerning any one act: Who 
1. POC, II, 88. 
hath done this?--such a question admits of only 
one true ans\'ler. Deeds ind their doers stand in 
one-one correspondence. 
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The danger, though, in all co-operation is that the co-
operative activities tend to become so complex and the 
labor so specialized that the individuals tend to lose 
their consciousness of the whole deed as an included part 
of their individual lives. The act of co-operation becomes 
incomprehensible to the individuals and they become like 
mere cogs in a vast and impersonal machine. Royce recog-
nizes this danger and sees in it the potential destruction 
of the community and consequently of any future co-operation. 
Accordingly, Royce proposes love as a necessary corrective 
element: 
If a social order, however complex it may be, 
actually wins and keeps the love of its members; 
so that,--however little they are able to under-
stand the details of their present co-operative 
activities,--they still--with all their whole 
hearts and their minds and their souls, and their 
strength--desire, each for himself, that such co-
operations should go on; ••• then indeed love 
furnishes that basis for the consciousness of the 
community which intelligence, without love, in a 2 highly complex social realm, can no longer furnish. 
The essential function of love is to view the whole as 
if it were part of our lives, as if we could grasp it in its 
wholeness. This love has not, according to Royce, an obvi-
ously human origin but comes 11 as if from above. 113 It may be 
1. POC, II, 24-25. 
2. POC, II, 91-92. 
3. POC, II, 102. 
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termed a quasi-mystical love. It is mystical in that it 
seeks union with others and yet it may be called 11 qua si-
mys tical11 because it does not succeed fully in its pur-
pose of mystical blending of selves with the attendant 
loss of individuality. 
Vihat our definition of the coramunity enables 
us to add to our former views of the meaning of 
loyalty is simply this: If the universe proves 
to be, in any sense, of the nature of a community, 
then love for this comnunity, and for God, will 
not mean merely love for losing the self, or for 
losing the many selves, in any interpenetration 
of selves ••• ; and if hereupon we can come to 
love this real community,--then the one and the 
many, the body and the members, our beloved and 
ourselves, will be joined in a life in which we 
shall be both preserved as individuals, and yet 
united to that which we love.l 
Religion would seem at this point to have a peculiar 
and invaluable function in Royce's modern community since 
the more developed and the more complex a cmnmunity becomes 
the more need for this contribution of religion. Royce's 
position here would seem to be a rebuttal to the Comtean 
view that with the advance in civilization the need for 
religion is outgrown. 
The longing of the individual is a longing to be united 
with his beloved, be it the mystic's God, other individuals, 
or the community. If left to itself, Royce believes this 
passive love would accomplish a mystical blending of members 
of the community. Although Royce admits that a mystical 
1. POC, II, 103. 
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blending of an individual with an ''other" may take place 
in individual and social life, he holds that the extreme 
of love leading to a blending is not essential to his 
view of the community and that the community is definitely 
better without it. In Royce's words: 
It is on the whole better for the life of such a 
community ••• if the individual member, instead 
of losing himself 'in a mystery,' kept his own 
individuality, in order to contribute his own 
edifying gift to the common life.l 
In fact, a mystical blending like James's "compounding of 
consciousness" would, according to Royce, destroy the com-
2 
munity; for, essential to the life of the community are 
the continued new deeds of co-operation. It would also 
invalidate the individual life; for the "ideal extension 
of the self gets a full and concrete meaning only by being 
actively expressed in the new deeds of each individual 
life. 113 
Love is the power that enables the individual to 
extend his life to include past and future events as his 
own. It further enables him to "view his fellow members' 
life as his own114 and to extend ideally his present self to 
include "the present life and deeds of his fellow." 5 Love 
also enables the individual to act as if he could survey 
the complexity and variety of life in a single unity of 
insight. 6 Love arises from seeing in co-operation the 
1. POC, II, 68. 4. POC, II, 93. 
2. POC, II, 98. 5. POC, II, 94. 
3. POC, II, 98. 6. POC, II, 96. 
51. 
fulfilment of the individual self. Love, in turn demands 
devoted work. 
This synthesis of the active and the passive and the 
ego and alter as represented in love and co-operation 
together with the ideal extension of selves is the core of 
Royce's concept of the comraunity. The ideal extension of 
the self is the fulfilment of the true self through love 
and co-operation. This combination of love and co-operation 
appears to be what Royce calls loyalty and constitutes the 
vital relationship of individuals within the community. 
ii. The cormnunity is an emergent social mind: social realism. 
From the ideal extensions of individuals Royce's 
community arises as an emergent social mind. This social 
mind is an organic unit and not a mere collection of indi-
victuals in relation. 
Thinkers who classify themselves as believers in social 
organicism hold that the social group is more than the sum 
of its parts. With this tenet Royce agrees: "A community 
is not a mere collection of individuals."1 Neither is it 
a collective entity such as a group of shoppers, the human 
2 
race or an external history of humanity. In some of Royce's 
earliest writings he is seen to subscribe to this organic 
view of society. In "Shelley and the Revolution", he says 
1. POC, II, 62. 
2. POC, II, 405. 
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"The world is more than the men in it, 111 and "the total 
of life is more than the sum of its parts." 2 In "The 
Nature of Voluntary Progress 11 he says, "a concert of 
individual actions produces a resultant greater than the 
numerical sum of the individual contributions, or else 
different in kind from this sum. 11 3 
Royce further regards the community as, what he calls, 
a 11real unit. 114 By this, of course , Royce does no t mean an 
undifferentiated entity but rather a single integration, for 
Royce defines unit and unity as a oneness that preserves 
variety. His argument for this point, similar to that sug-
gested by Wundt is that the community behaves as a unit, 
therefore it must be a unit, however its inner coherence 
5 
may be constituted. 
Another characteristic of social organicism is the 
reci procal determination between individuals and also between 
individuals and t he social group. As has been seen in the 
discussion of ideal self-extension, Royce's community is 
essentially determined by the individual members and their 
contribution. Royce insists also that the indivi dual needs 
the community: 
~fuen viewed as if I were alone, I, the individual, 
am not only doomed to failure, but I am lost in 
folly. The 'worki ngs' of my ideas are events whose 
significance I cannot even remotely estimate in 
1. FE, 69. 4 • P OC , I , 6 6 • 
2. FE, 69. 5. POC, II, 30. 
3. FE, 111. 
terms of their momentary existence, or in 
terms of my individual successes. 'My life 
means nothing, either theoretically or prac- 1 tically, unless I am a member of a community. 
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Royce goes beyond the common views of organicism by 
holding to a more literal analogy to the biological organ-
ism. In this he follows the tradition of Spencer. Royce 
states that the community is a "sort of live unit, that 
2 
has organs, as the body of an individual has organs." 
Lest it be concluded that by the expression "a sort of" 
Royce means a "live unit 11 in a Pickwickian sense, merely, 
we are told "each of the two, the cormnunity or the individual 
member, is as much a live creature as is the other. 113 
Carrying out the implications of this, he is led to go even 
4 further to say that the community also "grows and decays." 
Royce admits that the community does not have the same form 
of life as the individual self but that it has just as real 
a life is a doctrine on which he insists. 
The organic unity of the community is in Royce's view 
analogous to that of the individual in that it is a product 
of a time-process involving memory, expectation, and social 
evolution. Apart from tradition or custom and a temporal 
reference to the distant future a social group is not a 
community. A mob or a picnic does not qualify therefore 
as a community because although it may have or be a social 
1. ?OC, II, 312-313. 
2. POC, I, 62. 
3. P OC , I , 6 2. 
4. POC, I, 62, 64-65, 
167. 
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mind, it has no history and no significant organization. 
It is but a fleeting mass of feelings. It is no more a 
true community without temporal extension than is the 
individual a true self. 
Royce regards the community not only as a live organic 
unit but also as a social mind. It has, he believes, a mind 
of its own, 1 follows psychological laws in its behavior, 2 
3 is capable of loving and acting, and can be loved and 
4 
served. Royce follows a pragmatic argument in holding: 
A community behaves like a mind of its own. There-
fore it is a fair 'working hypothesis' for the psy-
chologist to declare that it is such5an entity, and that a cormnunity has, or is, a mind. 
Royce finds evidence that the community is mental in the 
existence of "mental products" such as languages, customs, 
6 
and religions. These social phenomena, he maintains, point 
to a social mind as their creator since individual hmnan 
minds could not produce them unless they were "somehow organ-
7 ized into a genuine community." Royce believes that its 
creator must be regarded as "in some sense, a single intel-
8 ligence 11 on the basis that each of these mental products 
is not a "collection of discrete psychological phenomena, 
each of which corresponds to some separate individual mind 
to which that one mental fact belongs, or is due," but rather 
9 that it has "intelligent unity." 
1. POC, I, 67, 95, 101. 5. Art.(l916), 295. 
2. POC, I, 95. 6. POC, I, 62. 
3. POC, I, 417. 7. POC, I, 62. 
4. POC, I, 99. 8. POC, II, 27. 
9. POC, II, 26. 
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A further view of the relationship between the 
individual and the cow~unity may be seen in his doctrine 
of the two levels of mental beings. Both the individual 
and the community, he holds, are merely different "grades" 
or "levels" of human life: the level of the individual 
1 
and the level of the community. In Royce's position, "any 
highly organized community ••• is as truly a hwnan being 
2 
as you and I are individually human." The difference 
between the levels, which Royce says is "profound", is 
apparently to be considered as a difference in degree or 
extent rather than in type. He admits, of course, an 
obvious difference in the nature of the two levels, namely, 
that the community hasn't one "separate and internally 
well-knit physical organism of its "own" through which its 
3 
mind may be expressed. Royce believes that in spite of 
this apparent deficiency, the community is more complex, 
4 
more powerful, and more enduring than individuals. 
In addition to being a mind or self, the community is, 
in Royce's view, a self-conscious person. In his latest 
writing on this point, Royce insists that a true community 
is, in a "perfectly literal sense, a person."5 He adds also 
conversely that 11 any human individual person in a perfectly 
literal sense, is a conrrnuni ty. 116 
1. POC, II, 57. 
2. POC, I, 166. 
4. POC, I, 16 7. 
5. Art.(l916), 295; cf. 
3. POC, I, 166. POC, I, 64. 
6. Loc. cit. 
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Royce, then, accepts social realism and rejects 
social nominalism. The community is not just an idea refer-
ring to individuals acting in concert, nor is it merely a 
gestalt or pattern. But being an organically live unit, it 
is, nevertheless, not an independent existent but rather an 
emergent actual entity perpetually dependent upon its genetic 
elements for its existence. Although Royce's community is 
not independent of the sustaining functioning of its elements, 
it is yet- objectively real and causal in its own right. 
Just as the individual person is dependent upon the proper 
functioning of the organic constituents of his body, so the 
community depends upon the proper functioning of its con-
stituent elements, the individual persons. 1 In the words 
of Royce: 
The true community, in our present restricted 
sense of the word, depends for its genuine ~ommon 
life upon such co-operative activities ••• 
A further implication of the concept of the connnunity 
3 
as an organic, live person is its dynamic character. The 
community is a continual creation of the evolutionary pro-
cess. It is dependent upon and is a product of the time-
4 process. The community that Royce proposes is no 11i'ixed 
entity" such as in metaphysics could be called a 11block 
universe;" it is a living, changing, acting, and growing 
person. 
1. POC, I, 81. 3. POC, II, 64. 
2. POC, II, 88. 4. POC, II, 99. 
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iii. Organic pluralism. 
The system developed by Royce in his later period 
may be called "organic plualism." The problem of the 
individual and his relationship to society, difficult for 
any thinker, Royce felt he finally solved. He was con-
vinced that in the concept of the conununity both "human 
1 
solidarity and individual destiny" were assured. 
Royce's very definition of the community "presupposes 
2 that there exist many individual selves" and "involves 
recognizing to the full both the existence and the signif-
icance of individual selves." 3 He insists: 
"· • a conununity does not become one, in the sense 
of my definition, by virtue of any reduction or 
melting of these various selves into a single 
merely preseit self, or into a mass of passing 
experience." 
It may be asked, though, was the unity which Royce 
conceived successful in maintaining individuality? In 
answer, within the scope of this disseration, it may be 
said that despite any flaws that may be found in Royce's 
latest solution, the reorientation of his philosophy 
around the concept of the Community has removed many diffi-
culties of his former system and incidentally has contrib-
uted fruitful suggestions to the solution of this difficult 
problem. 
1. POC, II, 75. 3. POC, II, 52. 
2. POC, II, 58. 4. POC, II, 6 7. 
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One of the changes in the latest Royce, which has 
already been noted, is that the individual self is no 
longer described as being the differentiated thought or 
will of the Absolute. Previously the self required con-
trast with a not-self and interaction with society to 
develop self-consciousness. But in this case social 
interaction was necessary to awaken an individual to 
what he already basically was, namely, a differentiated 
part of the Absolute Self. The process was similar to 
that of Platonic reminiscence. In the later Royce the 
individual self is held to have a "social nature 111 and 
a "social origin." 2 Experience has a social dimension. 
The individual is given in a social situation with others. 
The evolvement of both the human self and the community is 
an emergent product of their nrutual interaction. · Royce 
details how finite individuals acquire the capacity of self-
consciousness, of thinking, of purposive behavior, of moral 
devotion--in other words, how the true, complete self arises. 
A question may be asked in this connection whether 
the individual selves are antecedent to the social process 
as in Wundt. It would seem in Royce that the individual 
is not a self in the first instance, but becomes a minimal 
self only when .it has developed such a self in a context of 
social experience. A distinction should be made here, as 
1. P OC , I , 3 76 • 
2. POC, I, 363. 
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it is by Royce, between the social group and a "community" 
in his techrLical sense. After a minimal self arises in 
the social situation,it then creates a community out of 
its social environment. This community is then in turn 
the prerequisite to the fullest development of the indi-
vidual personality. This process of the evolution of the 
minimal self could be regarded as the position of evolu-
tionary critical naturalism except for Royce's idealistic 
framework. As it is, his view is still in harmony with his 
previous idealism and provides for a more reasonable solu-
tion than naturalism to the problem of how the personality 
can arise. Influenced by J. M. Baldwin and c. H. Cooley, 
Royce developed his later thought in the direction of the 
social-interactionalist school. This movement, accepting 
the constitutional factors as given, insist that the per-
sonality is fundamentally a social-cultural product. 
G. H. Mead, a student of Royce, developed this thought 
into what he called "social behaviorism."1 Their chief' 
emphasis was on the process by which the mature personality 
arose out of social interaction. Both John Dewey and Mead 
developed Royce's view that knowledge was a social activity 
(interpretation) by emphasizing that thinking and hence 
knowledge itself was essentially a social-cultural process. 
1 • Me ad , MS S • 
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This reciprocal creation or determination of the 
individuals and the community is, in Royce's view, a 
continuous process each being continuous·ly interdependent 
for its life, self-consciousness, self-enrichment, and the 
creation of values. "The true connnunity" according to 
Royce, ".depends for its genuine common life upon such 
co-operative activities."l Furthermore, "the connnunity is 
a being that attempts to accomplish something in time and 
through the deeds of its members." 2 The community, there-
fore, can never be said to be the sole result of the indi-
viduals in it nor can the individuals be solely the result 
of the connnunity of which they are members. Both individ-
uals and communities have personalities which are in some 
degree separate and distinct. In the theoretical event 
that a mystical merging of the individuals and the community 
should occur, Royce insists: 
Such an innnediate presence of all the community to 
all the members would be indeed, if it could wholly 
and simply take place, a mere blending of the selves, 
--an interpenetration in which the individuals van-
ished, and in which, for that3very reason, the real community would also be lost. 
On these grounds Royce suggests: "Let your community be as 
a chorus, and not as a company who forget themselves in a 
common trance. 114 
1. POC, II, 88. 3. POC, II, 97-98. 
2. POC, II, 64. 4. POC, II, 96. 
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Another basis for assuring the individual's integ-
rity as a member of the community lies in the previously 
1 
mentioned voluntary nature of his ideal self-extensions 
and his consequent memberships in the various communities. 
There is, in Royce's view, no externally authoritative 
control of one's extensions. There is, to be sure, a 
demand that the individual have some rational basis for 
his ideal self-extensions, but Royce insists: 
I must also myself personally share in this task 
of determining how much of the past and the future 
shall ideally enter into my life, ~nd shall con-
tribute to the value of that life. 
These self-extensions do not invalidate the pluralism of 
selves since in Royce the individuals make these extensions 
and construct t he unities on the basis of their own natures 
and a s an outgrowth of their search for self-rea lization. 3 
The concept of self-ex tension, although not with all the 
implications attached to it by Royce, is currently acce pted 
by members of psychological schools as far apart as t h e 
"Social Interac t ionalists" and t he "Pers onalists." Gordon 
w. Allport, a self-psychologist, discussing the extensions 
of the self and their 11intr,oception" by the self in a 
chapter on "The Mature Personality", says: 
vihat one loves becomes a part of him. And anything 
one can admire, feel s~npathy for, appreciate, 
revere, deliberately imitate, or become unconsciously 
identified with, may become introceQted into the 4 personality, and remain ever after a vital part of it. 
I. Of. above, 47. 
2. POC, II, 6 2. 
3. POC, II, 92. 
4. Allport, PER, 217. 
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The idea of community provides a fruitful basis for 
the solution of current problems of the relationship between 
the i ndividual and society. A critical evaluation will 
await a more complete analysis of the concept in t he next 
chapter. However, a few comments may be made now on the 
question of 11 proof 11 or 11 disproof" of a social mind. Paul 
E. Johnson, for example, states: 
To establish LRoyce'i7 position it would be necessary 
f i rst to prove the actual reality of a Group Mind. 
But this is generally recognized as an abstraction 
vnuch we use only as a figure of speech. There is 
no real eviden ce for this mysterious Social Mind 
that is not any one of us, yet something more than 
all of us. 
It may be asked what kind of "r eal evidence" would be neces-
sary to 11 prove the actual reality" of such an entity. I t 
would seem that the evidence need not be of a much differ-
ent kind than that required to substantiate any other philo-
sophical or theological hypothesis such as, for example, 
the existence of God, immortality, or even the existence 
of other persons. Also, Johnson's appeal to consensus 
gentium reflects much current criticism of the concept of 
a social mind. A great deal of recent criticism of the 
concept centers around the view that a mind or self can-
not exist without a nervous system. And yet many of these 
same critics believe in the existence of God or the indi-
vidual self after death. Legitimate criticisms are con-
1. Johnson, Art.(l935) 351. 
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cerned with the possibility of sharing any part of selves. 
And yet, without any kind of sharing, it would seem 
impossible to avoid extreme monadism. \~ether or not 
Royce's view is the most acceptable hypothesis is, of 
course, a matter for ful~ther evaluation. The paradox 
is described by Melvin Rader when he says: 
The more men are truly united the more they respect 
each other's differences. People who are in love 
treasure each other's individualities. Human beings 
should be both more differentiated and more united 
than they are now; and the unity that is the legit-
imate goal of human aspiration is the unity of 
difference.l 
Some compromise between extreme pluralism and monism seems 
to be indicated; Royce felt he had arrived at that success-
ful solution. The paradox of how an individual may be a 
member of a community. mind is no more serious than that of 
how the "specious present" may become a part of a continu-
ous experience of a person. In fact Royce believes that 
this is the manner in which the community comes into being. 
The resolution of the paradox, if there is any, will come 
not as "proved" but as the most coherent interpretation 
of our private and social experience. 
1. Rader, EAS, 158. 
C H A P T E R F 0 U R 
THE LOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL AS.PEcr.rs OF THE COMMUNITY 
AND TFffi INDIVIDUAL 
The logical and metaphysical questions raised in 
the discussion of the development of the self and t he 
community need further analysis for an adequate under-
standing of Royce's latest philosophy. 
1 . Interpretation as the logical basis of the community 
and the individual. 
The basic process involved in ideal self-extension 
and the life of the community is that of "interpretation." 
This is a social method of knowing and was de vel oped by 
Royce, under· the influence of Pe irce. Royce gave generous 
acknowledgment for Peirce's contribution but took respon-
sibility himself for his own metaphysi ca l generalizations 
Those ideas of Charles Peirce about Interpretation 
to which I shall refer, never, so far as I know, 
attracted William James's personal attention at 
any time. I may add t hat, until recently, I my-
self never appr eciated their significance. In 
acknowledging here my presen t indebtednes s t o these 
i deas, I have to add that, in this place, there is 
no room to expound them at length. • • Moreover, 
it is proper to say t hat Charles Peirce cannot be 
held responsible for the use t hat I shall here 
make of his opinions, or for any of the conclusions 
that I base upon them •••• 
Abandoning , then, any effort to state Peirce's 
case as he stated it, let me next call attention 
to matters which I should never have viewed as I 1 
now view them without his direct or indirect aid. 
1. POC, II, 115-117. 
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i. Limitation of perception, conception, and intuition. 
Royce criticized the traditional methods of percep-
tion, conception, and intuition as inadequate methods for 
understanding hwnan life and the world. Increasingly in 
his later philosophy Royce became convinced of the social 
character of existence. Therefore, what was needed, he 
felt, was a social method for understanding it. White-
head, in his doctrine of "prehension" does the same thing 
for all particular objects that Royce does here for minds 
engaged in the process of understanding the significance 
or meaning of events and other minds. 
Royce's criticism of the exponents of perception 
and .conception was based on the view that perceptual and 
. 1 
conceptual knowledge was not complete until communicated. 
He differed, therefore, from Bergson, who regarded intui-
tive perception as the ideal method of kn·owing, conception 
being necessary only because of gaps in the method of per-
2 
ception. Here, Royce follows Peirce 1 s repudia.tion of 
intuition. Peirce maintains that the self and all intro-
spective data are inferred: 
Introspection is wholly a matter of inference. 
One is immediately conscious of his Feelings, no 
doubt; but not that they are feelings of an ~· 
The self is only inferred. There is no time in 
the Present for any inference at all, least of 
all for inference concerning that very instant. 
1. POC, II, 148. 
2. POC, II, 124. 
Consequently the present object must be an 
external object, 1if there be any objective reference in it. 
Elsewhere, he denies that tta knowledge of the mind may 
66. 
be obtained, which is not inferred from any character of 
2 
outward things." Royce likewise differed from the. Pla-
tonic idealization of conception with its disparagement 
3 
of perception as a vain show. He went further to deny 
the view that even a synthesis of perception and concep-
tion is adequate: 
But a dual antithesis between perceptual and 
conceptual knowledge is once for all inadequate 
to the wealth of _the facts of life. When you 
accomplish an act of comparison, the knowledge 
which you attain is neither merely conceptual, 
nor merely perceptual, nor yet merely a prac-
tically active synthesis of perception and con-
ception. It is a third type of knowledge. It 
interprets. It surveys from above. It is an 4 
attainment of a larger unity of consciousness. 
Pragmatism is defective at this point, he thought, since 
ideas are actually limited by social boundaries and so 
what is needed to cross beyond is an interpreter in order 
to mediate the estranged concepts rather than a simple 
5 
cash value to correspond to a credit value. 
All such dual classifications of the knovdng proc-
ess are in Royce ' s view individualistic, unsocial, static, 
1. Peirce, CP, V, 313. 
2. Peirce, CP, V, 149. 
3. POC, II, 188. 
4. POC, II, 188. 
5. ?OC, II, 131-132. 
and are confined largely to externally supplied data . 
Royce felt that Kant most nearly approximated his view 
of interpretation in his doctrine of judgment (Urteil -
skraf~. ) However, Kant ' s distinction between sense, 
understanding, and reason does n o t paral lel Royce's 
distinction between perception, conc eption and interpre-
tation since in Royce's opinion Kant ' s "reason" merely 
1 
performs a higher degree of ·conceptual function . 
ii. Knowledge is mediative, triadic, and social . 
The method that appealed to Royce was that of "inter-
pretation" v1hich he derived from Peirce and g e neralized 
into a metaphysical theory of the world . 
2 
According to Peirce, the traditional two cate-
gories of thought include universals and individuals and 
may be known by conception and perception respectively. In 
addition, though, there is a 11 thirdn object of knowledge, 
"signs," which call for comparison, mediation, or inter-
pretation . It may also be called an expression of a mind, 
or, it may be regarded as, in its essence, either a mind 
or a quasi - mind, --an object that fulfills the functions of 
a mind . The reason for regarding signs in this way is 
that they express a mind and c all for an interpretation 
th ·rough some other mind , which acts as a mediator b e tween 
1. POC. II, 120. 
2 . Peirce, CP, V, 169-189 . 
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the sign, or between the maker of the sign, and some one 
to whom the sign is to be read. In addition, since the 
interpretation is a mental act and is an act which is 
expressed, the interpretation also becomes a sign which 
calls for further interpretation. 
1 Royce, adopting this Peircean view, offers examples 
of obvious matters in our experience that fall into this 
third category of signs that need to be interpreted : A 
translation of a text written in a foreign language; a 
judge's construction of a statute; a man ' s interpretation 
of himself and of his own life; our own philosophical 
interpretation of a religious idea; the practical inter-
pretation of our destiny, or of God; or, a metaphysical 
interpretation of the universe. 2 
Royce uses a s pecific example of bank notes to 
illustrate his view of the need for interpretation, a nd 
incidentally, to sho·w the inadequacy of pragmatism. Bank 
notes may be treated in terms of credit value or cash 
value when in one's own country. But at the border a fur-
ther transaction becomes necessary--an interpretation of 
the cash-values of one country in terms of the cash values 
in the other country. So, Royce proceeds, many of our 
attempts in knowledge are those of exchanging the values 
1. POC , II, Lect. 14. 
2. POC, II, 112-113. 
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of our own lives with those in foreign s piritual realms; 
credit values and the cash values are not always easily 
1 
exchanged. He insists that we have many such critical 
passings of boundaries even in our own inner life which 
must leave perception, conception, and intuition behind 
and take up the work of interpretation. 2 
Quotations from Peirce will s h ow more exactly the 
source of Royce's doctrines of comparison and interpre-
tation: 
Empirical psychology has established the fact 
t hat we can know a quality only by means of its 
contrast with or similarity to another. By con-
t rast and agreement a thing is referred to a 
correlate, if this term may be used in a wider 
sense than usual •••• The occasion of re5erence 
to a correlate is obviously by comparison. 
Peirce uses an example of a translation of a word in a for-
eign language to show the ne~d for a mediating representa-
• tion which represents the relate as standing for a cor rela te 
with which the mediating representation is itself in rela-
tion: 
Suppose we look up the word homme in a French 
dictionary; we shall find opposite to it the 
word man, which, so placed, represents homme 
as representing the same two-le gged creature 
which~ itself represents. By a further 
accmnulation of instances, it would be found 
that every comparison requires, besides the 
related thing , the ground, and the correlate, 
also a mediating representation which represents 
the relate to be a representation of the same 
correlate which this mediating repre sentation 
1. POC, II, 134. 
2. POC, II, 136. 
3. Peirce, CP, I, 292. 
itself represents. Such a mediating repre-
sentation may be termed an interpre~ant, because 
it fulfils the office of an interpreter, who 
says that a foreigner says the same thlng which 
he himself says. 
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Interpretation, for Royce, is essentially comparison 
and depends upon mediation. The contrasts, conflicts, and 
estrangements in our everyday experience need a mediating 
idea, a mental process to compare their likenesses and 
differences. Knowledge of others, or of oneself, or of 
the time process, or, in fact, awareness of the meaning 
and significance of anything, is impossible except that 
it be interpreted. Fundamental in the process of inter-
pretation is the inventing or discovering of the third 
idea by which the two distinct ideas are compared. As 
soon as data or facts are communicated, there. arises a 
m1nimum language situation which is social and involves 
an int erpreted element, an interpreter, and someone to 
2 
whom the interpretation is made. 
Royce has, in this tlnrd method of knowing, an 
epistemology that is in harmony with the conviction cul-
minating in his latest philosophy, that life and the 
world are essentially social in nature. 
Essential to the social nature of interpretation 
is its triadic structure. ttinterpretation," says Royce, 
1. Peirce, CP, I, 293. 
2. POC, II, 140. 
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1 
"is a conversation, and not a lonely enterprise." It 
is a communication from someone to someone. 
The triadic structure of eyery interpretation is 
nonsymmetrical, i.e. the functional relations are definite 
and permanent for this particular act of interpretation. 2 
However, the members of one act of interpretation may 
exchange places in subsequent processes, thus providing 
a dynamic, evolving, and directional process. 3 Royce 
maintains: 
The new community will be in a perfectly def-
inite relation to the former one; and may grow 
out of it by a process as definit~ as is every 
form of conscious interpretation. 
The superiority of a triadic relation, such as is 
involved in this third type of knowledge, over the purely 
dyadic ones in the traditional methods becomes apparent, 
Royce believes, at this point. Firat, the nonsocial 
character of the dyadic relation makes it inadequate to 
grasp the meaning and significance of dynamic social pro-
cesses. Secondly, when the dyadic relation is completed 
the process stops and as a result becomes subject to the 
criticism that knowledge is sterile or static. 5 
In contrast to these defects of the dyadic relation, 
the triadic relation is active, close to the changing life 
1. POC, II, 148. 4. POC, II, 213. 
2. POC, II, 141. 5. POC, II, 148-152. 
3. POC, II, 213. 
it interprets and is infinitely expandable to include 
all possible meanings in the world. 1 
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Interpretation is, then, in Royce's view, ideally 
an infinite process. The natural course of the process 
is unending, for each interpretation becomes a sign which 
in turn calls for another interpretation. Termination of 
the process, if it occurs, comes only through something 
rtarbi trary or external'' such as the death or separation of 
2 
a member from the social group. Royce goes further to 
say that interpretation is intimately involved in the 
time order and 11is strictly analogous both to the psycho-
logical and to the metaphysical structure of the world of 
time. 113 "The present", he believes, "potentially inter-
prets the past to the future, and continues to do so ad 
4 
infinitum." 
It is interesting to note that Royce acknowledges 
a similarity between his view of interpretation and Hegel's 
dialectical process. He says, though, that Peirce's theory 
of comparison and the mediating idea or "third" which inter-
prets it "is, historically speaking, a theory not d:eri ved 
5 from Hegel." He holds that Peirce's view of interpretation 
is an "extremely general process, of which the Hegelian 
1. POC, II, 270. 4. POC, II, 146. 
2. POC, II, 150. 5. ?OC, II, 185. 
3. POC, II, 147. 
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dialectical process is a very special case."1 Although 
Royce denies the historical connection of the views, he 
doesn't deny their similarity. 
'l1here is no essential inconsistency between the 
logical and psychological motives wlnch lie at 
the basis of Peirce's theory of the triad of 
interpretation, and the Hegelian interest in 
the play of thesis, antithesis, and higher syn-
thesis. But Peirce's theory, with its explicitly 
empirical origin and its very exact logical work-
ing out, promises new light upon m~.tters which 
Hegel left profoundly problematic. 
One of the chief differences between Royce's use of the 
dialectic and Hegel's is the emphasis Royce places on the 
individual "will to interpret." 
From the individual's point of view and with r efer-
ence to his inner psychological processes the will to inter-
pret, according to Royce, arises out of a basic personal 
urge to be "self-possessed." For, by its expression, the 
individual comes to self-1-::nowledge and knowledge of the 
meaning of life. 3 By discovering or inventing a "third " 
or mediating idea a person may "survey from above" and 
attain "a larger unity of consciousness. 114 The will to 
interpret succeeds in. discovering or creating a realm of 
conscious unity which constitutes a community of interpre-
tation. Through this community only, according to Royce, 
1. POC , II, 185. 3. POC, II, 193. 
2. POC, II, 185-186. 4. POC, II, 188. 
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can an individual understand his own life and its meaning 
and compare and interpret his own i deas . 
The will to interpret, in Royce 1 s view, constitutes 
an essential part of an individual's social nature. It 
is this will that prompts him to make a community of inter-
pretation with his fellows. "I am discontent", Royce says, 
"with my narrowness and your estrangement. I seek unity 
1 
with you." This will to interpret may be regarded as 
the logical aspect of the motive of ideal self-extension, 
which , in the previous chapter, was seen to be the basis 
for the creation of' the finite community. The finite com-
munity or the social mind, then, turns out to be, for 
Royce, essentially a co~munity of interpretation. Royce 
holds that if' at least three persons seek unity of under-
standing and thereupon will that one be an interpreter, 
another the interpreted, and another receive the interpre -
tation, they may together constitute a community of inter-
pretation. However, their ultimate goal of spiritual unity 
--complete understanding--is an "ideal event," "una ttain-
able under human social conditions, but definable as an 
ideal, in terms of the perfectly human experience which 
every successful comparison of ideas involves. 112 
1. POC, II, 209. 
2. POC, II, 211. 
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But Royce sees at present many such colY'.munities 
in varying degrees of approach to this ideal event, each 
made up of many persons co-operating for perfect under-
standing. The goal of us all--the fulfilment of our will 
to interpret--is the acualization of the Community of 
Interpretation. Royce believes that such a social organ-
ization fulfils his definition of the Community since "we 
shall be many selves with a common ideal future event at 
which we aim. 111 
2. The Community of Interpretation. 
The real world, according to Royce, is the Commu-
nity of Interpretation. As will be seen pre sently, he 
no longer in his later philosophy finds his earlier con-
cept of the Absolute a satisfactory concept to designate 
his social universe. This social untverse is an endless 
process of interpretation for it is made up of real signs 
and the process of their interpretation. There are for 
him two essential but contrasting ideas--"present experi-
2 
ence 11 and the "goal of experience. 11 These contrasting 
ideas, constituting an antithesis, have a wide variety 
of expression as they appear in the world process: The 
contrasts in epistemology are between ignorance and 
1. POC, II, 213. 
2. POC, II, 264-266. 
possible enlightenment. The contrasts in metaphysics 
are between appearance and reality, the actual and the 
possible, and the real and the ideal. In ethics the 
76. 
contrast is between the actual life and the ideal life. 
The problem of the world, he believes, to solve 
the contrasts within it. These contrasts need a counsel, 
a ·mediator, or an interpreter. The world contains, 
Royce believes, such an Interpreter and is the process 
1 
of their interpretation. In defense of this view Royce 
declares: 
You have no reason for believing that there is 
any world whatever, except a reason WPich implies 
that some interpretation of the antithesis both 
exists and is true. A real and a true inter-
pretation occur only in case the co2responding 
community exists and wins its goal. 
He defines the "real world", therefore, as "the true inter-
pretation of the problematic si tuation. 113 
Royce derived from Peirce his view of the need for 
a community of interpretation. 
Royce emphasized the social character of knowledge 
and the resulting need for a community of inter·pretation. 
It is interesting and informative to note the source of 
his position in the thought of Peirce. Peirce held that 
a community of interpreters was necessary to arrive at 
1. POC, II, 324. 
2. POC, II, 275-276. 
3. POC, II, 267. 
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truth through the inductive process. Induction, he holds, 
is probable or statistical inference from the parts to 
the whole. He cites the example of a bag of black and 
white beans from which a few handfuls are taken.. On the 
basis of this sample he maintains that a person can judge 
approximately the proportions of black and white in the 
whole. He concludes: 
This is identical with induction. Now we know 
upon what the validity of this inference depends. 
It depends upon the fact that in the long run, any 
one bean would be taken out as often as any other. 
For were this not so, the mean of a large number 
of results of such testings of the contents of 
the bag would not be precisely the ratio of the 
numbers of the two colors of beans in the bag.l 
His emphasis here upon the "long run" suggests the impor-
tant function of the community. He adds further: 
We cannot say that the generality of inductions 
are true, but only that in the long run they 
approximate to the truth. This is the truth of 
the statement, that the universality of an infer-
ence from induction is only the analogue of true 
universality. Hence, also, it cannot be said 
that we know an inductive conclusion to be true, 
however loosely we state it, we only know that 
by accepting inductive conclusions, in the long 
run our errors balance one another. In fact, 
insurance companies proceed upon induction;--
they do not know what will happen to this or 
that policyholder; they2only know that they are secure in the long run. . 
ThisfUnction as illustrated by the insurance companies is 
the function of the community in establishing cognitions 
1. Peirce, Cf;, V, 217-218. 
2. Peirce, CP, V, 218. 
that are real. Peirce explains his point further, in 
another connection where he says: 
And what do we mean by the real? It is a con-
ce ption which we must first have had when we 
discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion; 
that is, when we first corrected ourselves. Now 
the distinction for which alone this fact logi-
cally called, was between an~ relative to 
private inward determinations, to the negations 
belonging to idiosyncrasy, and an ~ such as 
would stand in the long run. The real, then, 
is that which, sooner or later, information 
and reasoning would finally result in, and 
which is therefore independent of the vagaries 
of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the con-
ception of r eality shows that this conception 
essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, 
without definite limits, and1 capable of a def-inite increase of knowledge . 
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Peirce's notion of the unlimited nature of the logical com-
munity also suggests the basis for Royce 's view of the infin-
ity of the Conununity of Interpretation. 
Royce and Peirce reject the view that the inductive 
process is based on faith in the uniformity of nature. 
Royce 2 insists that the objective facts alone should reveal 
the uniformity; it must not be assumed. He believes that 
a good sampling is probable due to the discoveries by 
logic through its examination of pervasive and fundamental 
order systems. Both Royce and Peirce agree that a com-
munity is the only secure way of validating the inductive 
process . 
1. 
2. 
Peirce, CP1 V, 186-187. Art.(l913) , 81. 
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As the process of interpretation the Cormnunity 
of Interpretation is temporal and infinite. It is also 
teleological, social, and historical. Royce insists that 
the world is an evolutionary process in which there is 
1 
"true development. " Being temporal, it is also social, 
since the triadic nature of the time- process is, like 
2 
interpretation, a social process. It is teleological 
because the very nature of time and the problems of the 
world consist in the endless pursuit of the ideal goal 
of interpretation which each new event and resulting 
interpretation requires. 3 
The world process is throughout, in Royce's view, 
the expression of the divine consciousness. In his words: 
"The whole process of the temporal order is the progres-
sive expression of a single spiritual meaning ••• 114 God 
is most evident as the Interpreter or the Spirit of the 
Community. The world, according to Royce, is the Com-
munity of Interpretation: 
Its processes are infinite in their temporal 
varieties. But their interpreter, the spirit 
of this universal community,--never absorbing 
varieties or permitting them to blend,--com-
pares and5 through a real life, interprets them all . 
Royce developed a theory of mathematical and log-
1. POC, II, 374. 4. POC, II, 393. 
2. POC, II, 280. 5. POC, II, 324. 
3. POC, II, 375. 
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ical order systems along with his theory of the cornrau-
nity. He holds that there is a system of order in nature 
that is the precondition of orderly thinking and is found, 
not made. It is not subject to 11 personal and private 
1 
caprice." There are three fundamental principles in his 
vie w: the realm of the Universals or Ideas is a System; 
objective momentous relations exist in the world and are 
the basis of inference; and the order and connection of 
rational processes copies an objective order and connec-
2 
tion, which is found, not made. 
The order systems, according to Royce, in abstract-
ion from the physical world, are ideals that our thought 
at once creates and finds as the facts or entities of a 
3 purely logical world. The physical world, he believes, 
exhibits this order only approximately. 4 
In this view, which may be called a logical real-
ism, Royce holds that relations presuppose classes of 
entities and that classes presuppose relations. Both are 
fundamental and each is impossible without the other. 5 
Royce also insists: 11We have an absolute logical need to 
conceive of individual objects as the elements of our ideal 
6 
order systems." There are four elements in his concept 
of order system and they are necessary in the f ollowing 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Art.(l913)i, 72-73. 
Art.(l913)1 , 71-72. Art.(l913) , 94. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
1 
Art.(l913)1 , 95. Art.(l913) , 96-97; 
106. 1 
Ar t .(l913) , 107. 
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order of logical importance: Objects, as unique indi-
victuals, to have classes; classes to define relations; 
rela t ions to have order; and order systems, ideal and 
1 
real, to be reasonable. 
Holding a position which he describes as Absolute 
Pragmatism, he says that the individual classification 
is "arbitrary" but the general laws of logic are absolute. 
He reconciles these contrasting principles by saying: 
"The logical principles define precisely the nature of 
the 'will to act in an orderly fashion' or in other words 
2 
of' the 'wi ll to be rational.'" He adds : "We 'construct' 
relational s ystems and classes in our ideal world. But 
we also 'find' t ha t at least some of these constru ctions 
3 
are necessary." There ar e, he says, modes of action 
and l aws of the rational will that are known not by their 
success but b y a t tempting to suppose that the modes of 
4 
activi t y do not exist or that the laws are not valid. 
Royce's Community of Interpretation may be regar·ded 
in one way as a pervasive order system within which the 
will to interpret may find its fulfilment. 
We must now turn to an analysi s of ' the vra. ys in 
which Royce's latest thought contains novel elements or 
emphases which, according to the position of the present 
1 . 
2. 
1 Art.(l913) 1 , 107. Art.(l913) , 111 . 3. 4. 
1 Art.(l913) 1 , 121 . Art.(l913) , 122. 
dissertation, result in a system best described as an 
organic pluralism. 
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3. The elevation of the status of the individual in the 
philosophy of the comraunity. 
There are several respects in which Royce's latest 
philosophy of the community provided for a greater signif-
icance of the individual than did his previous philosophy 
of the absolute . The most important of these are: the 
method of "interpretation", the essentially social aspect 
of the world, his provision for the exper•ience of value, 
and his greater emphasis upon the empirical. 
:i... I nterpretation as the logical basis for individuality. 
Interpretation, the third form of knowledge which 
Royce adopts in his latest philosophy, i s epistemically 
dualistic throughou t a nd thus provides a basis for i ncreased 
status of the indivi dua l self . 
Royce always objected to any epistemological identi-
fication of the finite knower with the objects referred to. 
The epistemological problem for him was to bridge the dual-
istic gap between the fi nite s ubject and t he object refer-
red to. But this was accomplished in the earlier Royce 
through the immediate awareness of our thought or inter-
nal meaning and its object or external meaning by the 
Absolute 1\..nower whose experi.ence we shared. 
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In The Religious As~ect of Philosophy the solution 
offered was our finite unity with the Absolute Thought of 
1 
which our thought was a par t . In The World and the Indi-
vidual our finite ideas or "internal meanings " became 
fulfilled in their "external meanings. 11 2 These external 
meanings of ours are internal meanings to the Absolute--
the "Other . " 3 For any of our finite ideas to be fulfilled 
or to be "means simply to express, to embody the complete 
internal meaning of a certain absolute system of ideas,--
a system, moreover, which is genuinely implied in the true 
internal meaning or purpose of every finite idea, how-
4 
e·ver fragmentary. 11 In The Conception of God he holds 
that our experience finds its object through the absolutely 
Organized Experience: "To assert a truth as more than 
possible is to assert the concrete reality of an experience 
that knows this truth. 11 5 
Thus it may be seen that, in the earlier Royce, 
although epistemological dualism holds for finite beings, 
epistemological monism is the ultimate basis of any indi-
vidual's success in knowledge. Such monism in epistemology 
leads logically to singularism since the very being of 
individuals as immediate objects of the absolute thought 
become logically exhausted in the consciousness of the 
1. RAP, 371. 4. WI, I, 36. 
2. WI, I, 339. 5 . COG, 41 . 
3. WI, I, 24 . 
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absolute mind. 
With the rejection of epistemological monism in 
the later Royce, a logical barrier is removed for the 
conception of a truly monadic constitution of the indi-
vidual self. 
Interpretation, as has been seen, is, according to 
1 Royce, a socially infinite process. The triadic and 
temporal character of every act of comparison or inter-
pretation is important to the determinateness or indi-
viduality of the selves involved in the process . Royce 
insists that there can be no merging of selves if the 
interpretation is to be successful. He says: 
There remain the three distinct mental functions 
••• All these minds or functions must be real 
and distinct and must form one real community, 
if inde~d the sign-post is a real sign-post 
at all. 
He illustrates this point by the example of a trial 
in court \Vherein no successful inter.f?retation of justice 
could be reached if either the litigant or defendant 
exchanged places or if either became the judge in the case. 
Considering the relation of interpretation to the 
time-process, it may be seen that each moment is in a 
definitely determinate relation to every other moment. 
What would happen to the time-order would happen to 
1. POC, II, 149 . 
2. POC, II, 288. 
85. 
processes of interpretation if there should be any blend-
ing or merging of the members. 
Even the knowing activity of God, the. Interpreter 
of the Community, is dualistic. Denying that "the divine 
consciousness is timeless, 111 Royce holds that the Inter-
preter's "endless task 11 of comparing or interpreting the 
essential antithesis of the world is a discrete triadic 
process in time in which the three "selves" cannot merge 
2 if the interpretation is to be a success. 
Royce does conceive of a totum simul with respect 
to God's synoptic vision of the world process but this 
still does not involve an identity of God's consciousness 
and the process known. After insisting that the Commu-
nity of Interpretation expressed its life in an "infinite 
series of individual interpretations" "each of which 
occupies its own place in a perfectly real order of time,"3 
he says that if the community of interpretation reaches its 
goal, the whole time-process may be spanned in some way 
by one insight which could survey the unity of its mean-
ing. Howeve1~, he insists: 11 Such a viewing of the whole 
time-process by a single synopsis will certainly not be 
anything 'timeless. 111 4 Royce thus abandons the ultimate 
epistemological monism formerly ascribed to the Absolute, 
1. POC, II, 378. 3. POC, II, 271. 
2. POC, II, 375. 4. POC, II, 271. 
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which logically resulted in a metaphysical monism. For, 
Royce denies anything immediate or intuitive in this 
synoptic survey by God, the Interpreter. This synoptic 
interpretation of the whole time-process is, like any of 
our finite human interpretations, mediate, comparative, 
and epistemologically dualistic. In the words of Royce: 
"Its nature is the one empirically lmown to us at any one 
moment when we clearly contrast two of our own ideas and 
find their mediator . 111 
The interpretative process is essentially the same 
for God as it is for man, even in his synoptic survey of 
the struggles of the world process in the light of his 
ideal plans. Royce, putting himself in the position of 
an interpreter in a community of interpretations and, 
assumlng it would be possible to win his goal of complete 
interpretation, insists that we "should indeed not inter-
penetrate, " 11 our functions would remain as distinct as now 
they are," there would be 11no melting together, no mystic 
blur, and no lapse into mere intuition. 112 He proceeds 
to say that the vision of the successful interpretation, 
for God as for himself, would simply be the fulfilment of 
his goal as interpreter. He concludes: 11This attainment 
would as little confound our persons as it would divide 
our substance. We should remain, for me, many, even when 
1. POC, II, 271. 
2. POC, II, 210. 
1 
viewed in this unity." 
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This synoptic survey by God is best interpreted 
in Royce, therefore, as God's dualistic self-knowledge 
rather than his monistic self-experience. The conse-
quences of Royce's adoption of dualistic and inferential 
interpretation as the ultimate form of knowledge are 
significant with respect to the freeing of the finite 
individual from being engulfed in the being of God. 
ii. The Community of Interpretation as essentially social. 
Since the social, temporal, and triadic nature of 
interpretation provides a logical basis for the plural-
ism of selves, as has been shown, and since the process 
of interpretation is in Royce's view the essential nature 
of the Community of Interpretation, there is a basis for 
affirming its social nature. The Community is, in other 
words, not a single Absolute Self but a social process of 
the inter-relations of its members. In the woras of Royce : 
The universe, if my thesis is right, is a realm 
which is through and through dominated by social 
categories. Time, for instance, expresses a sys-
tem of essentially social relations. The present 
interprets the past to the future. At each 
moment of time the results of the whole world 's 
history up to that moment are, so to speak, 
summed up and passed over to the future for hts 
new deeds of creation and of interpretation. 
1. POC, II, 210. 
2. POC, II, 280-281. 
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The Community is more on the order of a compre-
hensive unity than an all-embracing whole of fragments 
of itself as was true in the case of the Absolute. When 
Royce in The World and the Individual describes the nature 
of being, he says, "· •• whatever is, has its being, once 
more, only as a fact observed, and exists as the fulfil-
ment of a conscious meaning. That is our definition of 
Being. 111 The fate of the individual and the nature of 
the all-engulfing Absolute can be observed when we remem-
ber that any known fact is a "fact present to some con-
sciousness, namely, precisely to the consciousness that 
fulfills the whole meaning of whoever asserts that this 
fact is real. 112 The only consciousness meeting this 
requirement is, of course, the Absolute. 
The individual, despite Royce's assertion that he 
is not "lost in God," is still a sort of differentiation 
of the Absolute Will . For , "when I thus consciously and 
uniquely will, it is I then who just here am God's will, 
3 
or who just here consciously act for the whole. " 
After revising his position somewhat in the "Supple-
mentary Essay" in The Conception of God, he still says: 
"I shall, then, also strenously insist that the individ-
ual, as I define him, is free,--free with the identical 
freedom of God, whereof his freedom is a portion . 114 
1. WI, I, 398. 3. WI, I, 468 . 
2. WI , I , 39 7. 4. COG, 294. 
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In the discussion of the relationship of the indi-
vidual to the Cownunity, Royce no longer uses terms such 
as fragments of, parts of, or portions of. The relation-
ship which he reiterates is that of ttmembership in the 
Community 11 rather than parts of a Whole or Totality. 
Royce refers to: 
The sense in vn~ich there can be, in indivi dual 
human beings, despite their narrovmess, their 
variety, and their sundered present lives, a 
genuine consciousness of the !ife of a community 
whereof they are members ••• 
Far from the emphasis on the individual self as 
being a sort of differentiation of the Absolute Will, the 
later emphasis of Royce is upon the social origin. The 
individual self is more like the "self-created creature" 
of Vfhitehead. The individual datum self, as has been 
shown in the previous chapter, determines its true self 
by ideal self-extension or interpretation in a social 
situation. As Royce points out, a true community can be 
maintained only if the individuals preserve their self-
identity and make continual contributions to the group . 
He insists: 
Unless each man knows how distinct he is from 
the whole community and from every member of 
it, he cannot render to the community what love 
demands,--namely devoted work.2 
1. POC, II, 99. 
2. POC, II, 98. 
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Another aspect of the truly social character of 
Royce's Comr,1unity can be seen in the active eternal proc-
ess of connnunicatlon that constitutes the very life of 
the Community. "Interpretation, 11 for Royce, "is not a 
lonely enterprise." It is, rather, "a conversation. "1 
The historical and teleological character of .this 
process, along with the nonsymmetrical nature of the 
triadic relation of every act of interpretation, keeps 
the world's process moving on in a linear fashion in the 
2 time-order. Any interpretation by one mind becomes a 
sign to be interpreted to another mind in a ceaseless 
process. According to Royce: 
Since the interpretation is a mental act, and 
is an act which is expressed, the interpretation 
itself is, in its turn a Sign. This new sign 
calls for further interpretation. For the inter-
pretation is addressed to somebody. And so,--at 
least in3ideal,--the social process involved is endless. 
In contrast to his view in The World and the Indi-
vidual that "the goal of every finite life is simply the 
totality whereof this life, in its finitude, is a frag-
ment,114 the later Royce insists: 
The system of metaphysics which is needed to 
define the constitution of this world of inter-
pretation must5be the generalized theory of an ideal society. 
1. POC, II, 148. 4. WI, II, 135. 
2. POC, II, 141. 5. POC, II, 281. 
3. POC, II, 149. 
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And he adds: "not .the Self, not the Logos, not the One, 
and not the Many, but the Community will be the ruling 
category of such a philosophy. 111 The reference to the 
Self as not being the "ruling category 11 clearly refers 
to the Absolute as he formerly conceived it. 
The world cannot be a truly social universe with-
out the interaction of 11free 11 individuals, that is, per-
sons with some privacy of selves along with their common 
ties. Royce is seen to propose a view of the world as a 
Cownunity which requires for its own essential process, 
and thus existence, the individual integrity of its members. 
iii. The relation of the finite to value. 
With his increased emphasis on the reality and 
significance of time and evolution Royce appears faced with 
the problem of value. His de finition of the world as- an 
infinite process of interpretation would seem to force him 
logically into a conception of an active unending process 
without provi sion for completed perfection or for concrete 
experience and conservation of value. 
In answer to the need for a goal of completed per-
fection, he posited as an ideal the complete interpretation 
of the antithesis of the ideal and the actual. This goal 
1. POC, II, 281. 
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for the world process, however, would be unattainable 
1 in time. However, God, as the world's Interpreter, is 
able to experience any current stage of synthesis at any 
time and through interpretation experience the achieve-
ments of the world process toward its ultimate goal. 
The need for finite experience of creation and con-
servation of value he answered by means of the finite 
communities and by regarding- individuals as interpreters. 
The finite communities, or social minds, are, for 
Royce, communities of interpretation. They are dynamic 
and al·ways in pursuit of the goal of ultimate interpre-
tation. They are flexible in that the three elements, 
or functions, or selves of the community may exchange 
their roles at any time. According to Royce,' 11;L'ou, or 
my other nei ghbor, can at any moment assume the function 
of interpreter, while I can pass to a new position in 
the new community. 112 
The communities, regarded by Royce as persons, 
re present in all likelihood an attempt to provide centers 
of concrete value experience within the infinite process 
and below the level of the infinite being. As has been 
shown in the previous chapter, Royce believes there are 
certain values in and by the finite community. As 
1. POC, II, 272. 
2. POC, II, 213. 
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personal centers, these cor~~unities conserve value in 
a way more concretely related to the needs and interests 
of the individual. 
An illustration of their function could be indi-
cated by the value of having a hierarchy of governments 
from the city through the county and state governments 
within the framework of the federal govermnent. Or, 
perhaps, the process should be carried through federal 
govePnments to the United Nations, or the Great Community 
as Royce would want it developed. It is interesting to 
note here that Hegel glorified the nationalistic state 
and, although revealing traces in his Phi losophy of 
Right, failed to carry his dialectic to a world commu-
nity, whereas Royce, although less singularistic than 
Hegel, exalted the idea of the Great Co~~unity . 1 
The function of the Spirit of the Community as the 
Interpreter is to relate and to synthesize the ideal and 
the actual in the world process. The synthesis or inter-
pretation of the goals and their achievements in the finite 
cow~unity could be regarded as part of the process the 
World Interpreter was engaged in but taking place on an 
ontological level close to the life of the individual. 
The finite community, of course, could preserve 
1. HGC. 
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the past in its rich diversity within the dialectical 
process. Royce seems to believe that each interpretation 
owes part of its essential nature to the forces, events, 
and the deeds which give rise to it. Therefore a temporal 
and personal designation such as may be found in the finite 
communities is essential to each act of interpretation or 
each achievement of value in the life of the community. 
Each interpretation, he says, "occupies its own place in 
a perfectly real order of time 111 and "each of these real 
events has 
2 
verse." 
• • • a value which concerns the whole uni-
Royce's interest in conserving each value achieved 
in the hlstorical process of the worl d is similar to 
Hegel's. In the synthesis of the dialectical process the 
thesis and antithesis as well as previous syntheses are 
not lost sight of. Royce insists that 11 deeds once done 
are irrevocable."3 
The finite deeds of interpretation both in the 
individual and in the community have a permanence for 
Royce and find a stable individual existence at a concrete 
point in the time-process. 
The question of the personal character of the finite 
communities need not be a crucial difficulty with Royce. 
1. POC, II, 271. 
2. POC, II, 313. 
3. POC, II, 294. 
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The will to interpret, or in other WOI'ds the ability to 
rise up above our isolated or uninterpreted self, could 
be regarded as due to God, the Interpreter, immanent in 
the life of man. Royce apparently feels the need for 
some personal mediation between the actual (what man is) 
and the ideal (what he can be). Vfhat he suggests in the 
proces s of creating the finite connnunities is some 
"nisus ", to use Alexander's term, to foster the actual-
izati on of the i deal. 
The important considerations for Royce appear to 
be: that the 11 larger unity of cons ci ousnes s 111 attained 
by i n terpreta tion, that the process of the realization 
of the universal in the par ticular, and that the co-
operative evolution toward a coherent goal , in every 
instance be personal, and an integral part of the life 
of t he individual. 
The finite communities or social minds as they 
emerge in the evolutionary process coul d be regarded as 
concrete embodiments of t he ideal in time and under the 
influence of the Spirit of the Community. 
iv. Increased empiricism. 
The later Royce shows an increased emphasis on 
1. POC , II, 188. 
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the empirical and, in thus giving greater recognition 
to the things of finite experience, tends to enhance 
the status of the individual. 
Royce always strove to be empirical in his approach 
to philosophic interpretations. In The Religious Aspect 
of Philosophy he holds that: "The truth of religion and 
reality can be known to us only in our human experience.'~ 
And in The World and the Individual he says: "All know-
ledge is of matters of experience. 112 In The Problem of 
Christianity he continues his empirical emphasis declar-
ing : 
We have no ground whatever for believing that 
there is any real world except the ground fur-
nished by our experience, and by the fact that, 
in addition to our perceptions and our concept-
ions, we have problems upon our hands which need 
interpretation. Our fundamental postulate is: 
The world is the interpretation of the problems 
which it presents .3 
Royce always felt that mysticism was inadequate. 4 But in 
regarding it as an inadequate method in his later philos-
ophy, he did so because he thought of it as not social 
5 
enough . "Mysticism, 11 he says, "is the always young, it is 
the childlike, it is the essentially immature aspect of 
the deeper religious life." H~ adds also: 
No mystic can become truly religious unless, like 
all the really greatest mystics,--beyond all his 
illuminations, and besides all his mere experi-
1. RAP , 231. 4. WI, I, 47-87. 
2. WI, I, 11. 5. POC, I, 401. 
3. POC, II, 323. 
ences of fulfilment, or of the immediate 
presence of the Divine ,--he attains to a 
strenuous, active loyalty which can over-
come rhe world only by living in the commu-
nity . 
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Of course, neither Royce nor any other phil osopher 
of his profound breadth could be contained within the 
limits of scientific demands for scientific verification. 
However, although Royce was not empirical in this positiv-
istic sense, he was definitely empiri cal in .the sense 
that he started with the facts of experience and develop-
ed his metaphysics as an interpre tation of them. Royce's 
increased interest in the importance of the social led 
him to be more concrete in his later empiricism. Along 
with this was his increased confidence in man's ability 
to make discoveries about his world through scientific 
and empirical processes . 
If, then, you seek for a sign that the uni-
verse contains its own interpreter, let the very 
existence of the sciences, let the existence of 
the happy inventive power which has made their 
progress possible, furnish you such a sign. A 
being whom nature seems to have intended, in the 
first place, simply to be more crafty than the 
other animals, more skilful in war and in hunt-
ing, and in the arts of living in tribal unities, 
turns out to be so attuned to the whole of nature 
that, when he once gets the idea of scientific 
research, his discoveries soon relate to physical 
matters as remote from his practical needs as is 
the chemical constitution of the nebulae, or as 
is the origin and destiny of this earth , or as 
is the state of the natural uni verse countless 
ages ago in the past . In brief, man is not 
1. POC, I, 401-402. 
vn1at he seems, a creature of a day, but is 
known to be an interpreter of nature. He 
is full of aptitudes to sound the depths of 
time and of space, and to invent hypotheses 
which it will take ages to verify, but which 1 
will, in a vast number of cases, be verified. 
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A notable shift in emphasis can also be noted with 
reference to his earlier contrast between the world of 
appreciation and the world of description. Royce regarded 
appreciation as individual and as dealing with reality. 
Description was social and communicable but dealt with 
the world of appearance. He exalted the activities of 
appreciation and, in harmony with his more or less dis-
dain for the world of the physical sciences, disparaged 
activities of description and gave them a place inferior 
2 to appreciation. The later Royce, in accord with his 
increasing emphasis upon the empirical and the social as 
well as his greater respect for science, dropped the dis-
tinction between these two activities. His .emphasis turned 
to the social and dualistic process of description, and 
this method he exalted in his view of interpretation. 
In his later philosophy he provides a central place 
f'or time and causality. "The - time-process," he says, "and 
the ideal extensions of the self in this time-process, lie 
at the b asis of the whole theory of the connnunity."3 
1. POC, II, 417-418. 
2. SMP , 409-415; 424-428. 
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Royce does not say specifically that the never- ending 
process of interpretation is merely coextensive with 
the time-order, as Bergson would say , or, whether it 
is contained within it . Concerning the . relation of the 
Community to time , he says , "The concept of the community , 
as thus analyzed, stands in the closest relation to the 
II 1 
whole nature of the time - process . And wlth refer-
en ce to God's relation to time he adds, "We do not declar~ 
in our metaphys i cal doctrine, that the divine conscious-
2 
ness is timeless .. " 
The time-order, for Royce , is never ending, for 
"· •• the present potentially interprets t he past to the 
3 
future, and continues to do so ad infinitum." It is his 
view that the present may be defined as such a "po tential 
4 
interpretation . " Causality assumes an i mportant place 
in h1.s emphasis on the significance of activity and the 
whole evolutionary process of the Universal Community . 
This concept of the Community as an infinite tem-
poral system constituted an important advance in Royce's 
thought. It is true that there are developments toward 
this v iew in the Conception of God and later in the 
"Supplementary Essay 11 to t he World and the Individual. In 
1 . POC, II, 52. 3. POC, II , 146. 
2. POC , II, 378 . 4. POC , II, 147. 
the latter work Royce states : 
The true Infinite, both in mul ti t ude and in 
organization, although in one sense endless , 
and so i ncapable i n that sense of being com-
pletely grasped , is i n another and precise 
sense something perfectly deta:rrriina.t e . Nor 
is it a mere monotonous repetition of the 
same , over and over. Each of its determi -
nations has individuality , uniqueness, and 
novelty about its own nature . 
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However, he goes on to maintain that this ordered experi -
ence is a totum simul : 
In consequence, the whole en dless series , 
in so far as it i s a reali ty , must be present , 
as a determinate order, but2also . all at once , to the Absolute Experience. 
In his Conception of God he falls short of the idea 
of the infinite process of interpretation developed i n the 
concept i on of the community. Accord:irig to Royce: 
An Omniscient Being would be one who simply 
found presented t o him , not by virtue of frag-
mentary and g radually c ompleted processes of 
inquiry , but by virtue o f an al l-embracing , 
direct , and transparent insight into his own 
truth,--who f ound thus presented to him, I 
say, t he complete, the fulfilled answer to 
every genuinely rational question. Observe 
the terms used . I say, the answer to every 
ques tion.3 
The marked change in Royce ' s latest thought i s apparent 
when he says : 
Afte r the foregoing discussion of the na ture 
a nd the processes of interpretation , we are n ow 
secure from any accusat i on that , from this point 
of view , the real world is anything merely stat i c , 
1 . WI, I , 568 . 
2 . V'!I , I, 568 . 
3 . COG, 8 . 
or is a mere idea wi thin the mind of a finite 
self , or is an Absolute that is divorced from 
its appearances, or is any merely conceptual 
reality, or is 'out of time,' or is a 'block 
universe,' or is an object of a merely mysti-
cal intuition . 
After emphasizing the importance of individual deeds, 
Royce insists on the metaphysical reality of time : 
If, then, the real world contains the Community 
of Interpretation just characterized, this 
co~munity of interpretation expresses its life 
in an infinite eries of individual interpre-
tations, each of which occupies its o\vn place 
i n a perfectly rea l order of time.2 
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Considering the p s si bili ty of the connnuni ty of 
interpretation reaching its goal, Royce admits that the 
whole time-process would be spanned in some way by one 
insight which would survey the unity of its meaning. 
However, it has been made clear that Royce discarded the 
former idea of the totum simul, for this synoptic survey 
is a disct~sive, interpreta tive, or mediated insight of a 
type identical with any act of interpreta tion on the part 
of any finite individual. 
Such a viewing of the whole time-process by a 
single synopsis will certainly not be any-
thing 'timeless.' It will not occur, on the 
other hand, at any one moment of time. But 
its na ture is the one em_Eiricallr_ known to us 
at any one moment when we clearly contrast two 
of our ovm ideas and find their mediator.3 
1. POC, II, 270. 
2. POC, II, 270-271. 
3. POC, II, 271 . Italics not in original. 
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This change by Royce in the direction of grea ter 
empiricism becomes more noticeable when his views in the 
fore going discussion are compared with his earlier denial 
of the metaphysical reality of human progress. In dis-
cussing the human pursui t of knowledge and goodness, 
Royce declares : 
For us this is progress. This progress is the 
form taken temporarily i n us by the good will . 
But for God this is no real progress. There-
fore is it indeed true that the moral insight 
in us must lead us to aim at progress in good-
ness, just as , on the other side, the rational 
element in us leads us to aim at progress in 
knowledge . But, meanwhile , our moral progress 
and our rational progress, mere 1ninor facts 
happening at a moment of time, are but insig-
nificant elements in the infinite life in which, 
as a whole , there is and can be no progress, but 
only an infini t e variety of the forms £f the 
g ood will and of the higher knowledge. · 
Also, either .,as the cause of, or the effect of, the 
increased concreteness of Royce's empiricism was his new 
interest in and respect for science and the world of the 
sciences. It is likely that Peirce was responsib le in 
part for this development in Royce's thinking s ince Peirce 
pointed out to him among other things the metaphysical 
import of t he fruitfulnes s of scientific induction. 2 
Royce, far from disparaging s cience in his later 
philosophy, regarded the community of scientists as not 
1. RAP, 46 '7. 
2. POC, II, 393; cf. POC, II, 41'7-418 . 
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only a model for the nature of the Community of Inter-
pretation, but as a chief contributor among all the 
types of communities to the creation of the Community. 
In the words of Royce : 
If the spirit of scientific investigation, or 
of learned research, shows signs--as it already 
does--of becoming one of the best of all forms 
of unifying mankind in free loyalty, then regard 
science not merely as in pos sible harmony with 
religion, but as itself already one of the prin-
cipal organs of religion.l 
Further, he says, "the scientific spirit is indeed one of 
the noblest and p1.1I'est forms of loyalty. 11 2 
Associated with Royce's increased interest in sci-
ence and the individual's status is his concrete interest 
in events, things, and selves, which he regarded as 11 signs 11 
or "quasi-minds." In Royce's later philosophy the knower'g 
ideas in the act of interpretation had a more concrete 
quality and were not regarded so much as entities in the 
mind apart from the world of things. 
v . Increased si gnificance of the I ndividual. 
Royce's increased interest in the concrete gives 
more significance to the finite individual. He still 
maintains a Calvinistic attitude, though, of minimization 
of the unextended or uninterpreted life. He says: "My 
1. POC, II, 431. 
2. POC, I, 423 . 
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life means nothing, either theoretically or practically, 
unless I am a member of a community. 111 But for the indi-
vidual who extends himself, he declares: "Full of won-
ders is nature. But the most wonderful of all is man 
the interpreter,--a part and a member ••• of the world's 
infinite Community of Interpretation. 112 
It is important to note that the method of salva-
tion depends not on a principle of self-renunciation but 
on ideal self-extension. It is voluntary and the individ-
ual selects the type of life he wants to be by selecting 
or creating communities which give the type of meaning he 
wants for his life. 
There is, then, an important difference in the goal 
for the life of the individual in the community in con-
trast to the former Absolute. In The World and the Indi-
vidual he says: "The goal of every finite life is simply 
the totality whereof this life, in its finitude, is a 
fragment." 3 
In the later Royce, the communities that he is 
loyal to and serves are those determined by hls own ideal 
self-extension. Although the goal for man in the later 
Royce is to further the coming of the Universal Community 
or the Beloved Community, tlns ideal is based on the will 
1. POC, II, 313. 
2. POC, II, 418. 
3. WI, II, 135. 
of the individual. "The will to interpret," he says, 
11is the will to be self-possessed."1 
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Royce's emphasis on the significance of the indi-
vidual is revealed in his view that man himself consti-
tutes a finite community and can perform the function of 
a community. With the abandonment of his basically monis-
tic epistemology and the adoption of the dualistic method 
of interpretation Royce has allowed the individual increased 
status in the world. "Man, 11 he says, "is known to be an 
interpreter of nature. He is full of aptitude to sound 
the depths of time and of space, and to invent hypotheses 
which it will take ages to verify. 11 2 Royce no longer 
regards it as necessary that the individual knower be iden-
tified with an inclusive infinite consciousness in order 
to understand his world. 3 Any individual can help from 
a community of interpretation and be the interpreter.4 
Considering Royce's position of "absolute voluntarism", 
however, it must be kept in mind that, although "the 
expression of the will Lto interpret? constitutes itself 
an actual life, 115 "there are absolute standards for the 
will." And this "right attitude of the will towards the 
u~tverse ••• when once assumed, is essentially creative 
of its own realm of deeds. 116 
1. POC, II, 193. 4. POC, II, 213; 205. 
2. POC, II, 418. 5. POC, II, 294. 
3. Cf. WI, I, 396. 6. POC, II, 293. 
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Along with Royce ' s increased emphasis on time there 
is also an emphasis on the creative deeds and activities 
of the individual. The individual seems to be engaged in 
a vital, meaningful, and constructive activity in the world 
process with actual achievements towards a real goal. 
It is noticeable, too, that in the relation of the 
individual and the community there is a strong sense of 
mutual interdependence and reciprocal benefit. The rela-
tion of the individual to the community is not that of 
benefit to one at the cost of the other. It is not, in 
other words, a question of the individual versus the 
community. 11Loyalty fulfils the individual, not by 
annulling or quenching his individual self- expression,tt 
Royce insists, "but by teaching him to assert himself 
through an acti;e and creative devotion to his community."l 
It has been shown how the individual's life and 
meaning depends upon his ideal self-extension (interpre-
tation) or what may be called his self-realization within 
the community. But it is equally true that the community 
is dependent upon the individual. The community, for Royce, 
"depends .for its very constitution upon the way in which 
each of its members interprets himself and his life . 112 
Also Royce insists that we are "helplessly dependent on 
1. POC, I, 401. 
2. POC, II, 111. 
human fidelity for some of our highest goods ••• rrl 
Another factor which has significance for the 
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status of the individual is the voluntary relation which 
he bears to the Universal Community. Royce states that 
"we are members, if we choose, of the truly universal com-
munity.112 There is an important ethical matter involved 
since to belong by nature as in his view of the Absolute 
does not involve an ethical choice. Whether an indi-
vidual participates, then, in the Universal Community 
depends upon the individual. 
One or more individuals can, in fact, destroy 
communities. Of course, the probability of the destruction 
of all communities is remote since the Spirit of the Com-
munity (God) should guarantee a measure of community. The 
Spirit of the Comrnunity could be regarded as a priori just 
as Kant's categories of the understanding are. The Spirit 
of the Community is expressed in the social nature of the 
individual--the will to interpret. 
We may be said to be born with tendencies to inter-
pret and thus to be capable of becoming a member of a 
comrnunity. But these tendencies are not mandatory and 
as a result the individual's initiative is preserved. The 
individual's choice is real and not just a mere appearance. 
1. POC , I, 299. 
2. POC, II, 388. 
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It is, in James's phrasing, a "live option." 
4. Personalistic organic pluralism. 
The previous analysis of the genesis of the self 
and the community concluded that Royce's system was essen-
tially what might be called an organic pluralism. The 
analysis of his logical and metaphysical views confirms 
this position. 
Philosophic labels are difficult of application. 
It would be difficult to find a philosopher who would 
admit that he was either a strict singularist or a strict 
pluralist. Philosophers vary from one another within the 
extremes largely with reference to their degree of emphasis . 
The same is true as regards the comparison of the earlier 
and later Royce. It is the position of this dissertation 
that Royce in his latest philosophy could be said to have 
developed in the direction of pluralism and away from his 
former position. The shift in his position is significant 
enough so that his latest philosophy should properly be 
called a personalistic organic pluralism. 
Since Royce believes that the universe in its proc-
1 
ess of evolutionary development is the expression of the 
divine self, an orientation of his metaphysical position 
1. POC, II, 217, 374. 
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may be made around that concept. 
Royce regards God as the Community of Interpre-
tation, which is the eternal process of reconciling or 
interpreting the essential contrasts or antitheses between 
the actual and the ideal in all its variations. 1 He also 
regards him as the Beloved Community or what he means when 
he speaks of the 11 ti•uly 11 Universal Community . 2 This is 
the ideal goal of all interpretation but is a term used 
by Royce to refer undoubtedly to the religious community 
or what is the same thing,--the successes already achieved 
in interpretation or in the actualizing of the ideal. He 
speaks repeatedly of the infinite process of interpretation 
3 
seeking to achieve its goal. In one connection he says: 
" 'Create me,'- - this is the work that the Church ffihe Belov-
ed Cormnunit.V, viewed as an idea, addresses to mankind. n4 
There is an element of serious confusion in Royce's 
use of the word "interpretation" to mean both the process 
and the result of the process. But a distinction such as 
just made is necessary for clarity. 
Royce apparently, then, holds a somewhat trinitarian 
view of God. For God is thought of also as the Spirit of 
the Co~~unity or the world Interpreter. God, the Inter-
preter, like the interpreter in any community, is the chief 
1. POC, II, 264-266. 3. POC, II, 375. 
2. POC, II, 388. 4. POC, I, 54. 
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member. Royce asserts: 11 The interpreter appears, then, 
as the one of the three who is most of all the spirit of 
the c ommunity, dominating the ideal relations of all three 
members. 112 
As the Interpreter, he should be thought of as a 
personal God . The fact that he is also expressed as the 
world process of interpretation in which individual selves 
and finite communities are members should not detract from 
his monadic nature since he is dominant and has a superior 
;-, 
role as the Interpreter. Royce says : 
But the one who is, in ideal, this Chief, is 
so because he is first of all servant. His 
office is to conform to the mind which he 
interprets, and to the comprehension of the 3 
mind to which he addressed his interpretation. 
The universe, as the Community of Interpretation, 
is the process of interpretation and contains the Beloved 
Community so far as it has actualized the eternal goal of 
complete interpretation of all estraneements of the actual 
4 from the ideal. The Co~~unity also contains as its chief 
member, God, the Interpreter. According to Royce: 
And, if, in ideal, we aim to conceive the 
divine nature, how better can we conceive it 
than in the form of the Community of Interpre-
tation, and above all in the form of the Inter-
preter, who interprets all to all, and each 
individual to the world~ and the world of spir-
its to each individual. 
1. POC, II, 219. 4. POC, II , 389. 
2. POC, II, 216. 5. POC, II, 219 . 
3. ~oc, II, 216. 
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The finite comnruni ties constitute phases in the 
dialectical process in a position between the level of 
the infinite and the level of the finite individual. 
They may be interpreted as being stimulated by God, the 
Interpreter, but created or not by the voluntary action 
of the individuals. To the extent that they achieve 
interpretation they and the individual members become 
members of the Beloved Community. Royce does not make 
a distinction between a strictly relig ious and a secular 
will to interpret. It is interpretation "which makes the 
pure s t forms of love for communities possible. 111 Any 
person who is loyal to the spirit of true interpretation 
and wills to interpret must be in love with the community 
and is meanwhile engaged in the process of interpreting 
the world. In this task he is co-operating in a divi ne -
human process and is bringing into existence the truly 
Uni versa l Community in the form of the Be l oved Corr~unity. 
I n Royce's words : 
When Christianity teaches us to hope for the 
community of all mankind, we can readily see 
that the Beloved Community, whatever else it 
i s, will be , wh~n it comes, a Community of 
Interpretation. 
The concept of t he Community is the substitute--
certainly not the equivalent--of Royce's former concept 
1. POC, II, 218. 
2. POC, II, 219. 
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of the Absolute. Royce uses the term Absolute only 
three times in The Proble~ of Christianity, his latest 
. 1 •t• 1 metaphyslca wrl lng. He says in one instance: 
This essentially social universe, this com-
muni ty which we have now declared to be real, 
and to be, in fact, the sole and supreme 
reality,--the Absolute ••• 2 
His meaning here indicates merely his view that the Com-
munity of Interpretation is equivalent to the world. 
Another reference to an Absolute is somewhat unclear: 
"In him ffiod, the Interpreteythe Connnunity, the Indi-
vidual, end the Absolute would be completely expressed , 
3 
reconciled, and distinguished ." This passage indicates, 
at least his loss of respect for the Absolute as an all-
sufficient description of all reality. In the third 
reference to an Absolute Royce says that on the basis of 
his view of interpretation, 
We are now secure from any accusation that the 
real world is anythine merely static, or is a 
mere idea within the mind of a finite self, or 
is an Absolute that is divorced from its appear-
ances, or is any merely conceptual reality, or 
is 1 out of time,' or is a ' block universe, ' ~r 
is an object of a merel·y mystical intuition. · 
"The system of metaphysics, " he says, "which is needed to 
define the constitution of this world of interpretation 
must be the generalized theory of an ideal society ."5 
1 . POC, II, 220, 270, 296. 4. POC, II, 270. 
2. POC , II, 296. 5. POC, II, 281. 
3. POC, II, 220. 
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He adds: "Not the Self, not the Logos, not the One, 
and not the Many, but the Co~~unity will be the ruling 
category of such a philosophy. 111 
A final point must be made clear concerning Royce's 
own reaction to the changes in his philosophic system. 
In answer to charges by his critics that his philosophic 
system became inconsistent with the publi shing of The Prob-
lem of Christianity he replied in a letter to Miss Calkins: 
These two ideas, the Community, and the Spirit 
ithe Holy Spirit of Christian theologi7, have 
been growing ever since ithe prophets of Israel?. 
They are growing today. They certainly have 
assumed, in my own mind, a new vitality, and a 
very much deeper significance than, for me, they 
ever had before I wrote my Problems of Christi-
anity. That book records the experience and the 
reflections vrhich have been worki ng in my mind 
daily more and more ever since I wrote it. These 
reflections constitute for me, not something incon-
sistent with my former position, but a distinct 
addit ion to my former pos ition, a new attainw~nt, 
--I believe a new growth. I do not believe that 
you change in a way involving2inconsistency when you reinterpret former ideas •. 
3 Here and elsewhere · Royce speaks of his "novel" views, his 
"developing " ideas, his "new growth," and his 11 new attain-
ment." And yet at the same time he seems to object to the 
thought that his latest views are inconsistent with his 
former position. Perha ps he feels that throughout his 
life he has been searching for an adequate solution to 
1. 
2. 
-.: 
....,. 
POC , II, 281 . 
Art.(l916 ), 294. 
Supra, 2-6. 
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the prDblems he had recognized from the beginning. The 
various stages in what may be called this dialectical or 
interpretative process were not, in his estimate, incon-
sistent, but rather in their developinG manner working 
toward the final synthesis. In other words, he undoubt-
edly feels that he has finally accomplished what he had 
long ago set out to accomplish. It is certainly apparent 
from his curiosity as to his "precise relationship to 
Bowne " and his statement tha t he supposed that their 
"agreements were rather on the inci•ease towards the end 
1 
of his work" that Royce would admit arriving at a more 
plurali stic pers onal idealism. 
1. Royce, letter to E. s. Brightman, July 16, 1913. 
C H A ~ T E R F I V E 
THE RELATION OF THE CONCE~T OF THE COI~ruNITY TO THE ETHICAL 
AND RELIGIOUS LIFE OF THE I NDIVIDUAL 
Royce's concept of the community has a significant 
influence on the status of the individual with reference 
to his ethical and religious life. 
1. The nature of loyalty. 
The central concept of Royce's ethics is loyalty. 
The one great practical lesson of the moral life, Royce 
says, is this: "In loyalty, when loxalty is properly 
defined, is the fulfilment of the whole moral law!. "1 Since, 
according to Royce, virtues such as justice, charity, indus-
try, wisdom, spirituality can all be defined in terms of 
enlightened loyalty, a person can truthfully center his 
entire moral life around a rational conception of loyalty. 
The question of just how adequate this concept is 
in ethics depends, of course, on the definition of it. 
For Royce it is "the willing and practical and thorough-
2 going devotion of a person to a cause." He would empha-
size the voluntary aspect and the practical and sustained 
devotion to whatev~r cause was selected. As examples of 
loyalty, Royce mentions the devotion of a patriot to his 
1. PL, 15. 
2. PL, 17. 
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country, the devotion of a martyr to his religion, and 
the devotion of a ship's captain to the duties of his 
office. 
"Loyalty is never mere emotion," according to 
Royce. 1 He concedes that adoration and affection may 
go with loyalty, but these alone can never constitute 
loyalty. Furthermore, the devotion of the loyal man 
involves a sort of restraint or submission of his nat-
ural desires to his cause. It is impossible to express 
loyalty without self-control. By this, Royce means, that 
the loyal person does not merely follow his OVnl impulses, 
but rather looks to hi~ cause for guidance. This cause 
tells him what to do and he does it. This devotion to 
his cause is entire, for he is ready to live or to die 
as the cause directs. 
It would appear that this cause which a person 
served would be completely external to him and autocrat-
ically dictating his duty to him. Royce does want t() guar-
antee that when a man loyally serves his cause, he is not 
seeking his own advantage. However, Royce believes that 
if a man is devoted to a cause he must necessarily value 
the cause personally, take interest in it, love it, and 
be well pleased with it; otherwise he could not be devoted 
1. PL, 18. 
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to it. 
On the other hand, loyalty, for Royce, never 
means following one's own pleasure viewed as his pri-
vate pleasure and interest. For, he argues, 1 if a per-
son is loyal, his cause is viewed by him as something 
outside of himself. It is much larger than any private 
self. It has its own value and this essential value it 
would keep even if the lo~al person's private interest 
were left out of account. A truly loyal person believes 
that his cause is objective i.e. is beyond his private 
self, and has its own value even if he dies. And this 
is the reason that a person is ready to die for his 
2 
cause. "Loyalty, then, 11 according to Royce, 
fixes our attention upon some one cause, bids 
us look without ourselves to see what this 
unified cause is, shows us thus some one plan 
of action, and then says to us, 'In this cause 
is your life, your will, your opportunity, 
your fulfilment.t3 
With this preliminary definition of loyalty in hand 
it will be possible to see more clearly the advancement 
Royce made over his earlier ethical views. 
2. Loyalty to the community as more concrete and personal 
than loyalty to the Absolute. 
The ethical views contained in Royce's philosophy 
1. PL, 19. 
2. PL, 19. 
3. PL, 42. 
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of the community provided an advance over his previous 
ethics in the direction of more concreteness as well as 
more consideration of the individual as an ethical end. 
The earlier ethical views of Royce were largely 
formalistic. "Loyalty," he said, "is the whole duty of 
man. 111 
Royce's earlier formalistic ethics had serious 
defects. It was not specific enough, for example, about 
how to resolve conflicts between loyalties~ He did try 
to relieve its strict formalism by introducing the ele-
ment of enlightenment in the motive of loyalty. 2 But, 
if loyalty is an intrinsic3 and a supreme good, 4 rational 
enlightenment should not be able to increase its value 
or to guide its direction. "Enlightenment" actually 
appeals to a standard more ultimate than loyalty. 
There is an analogy here to the problem Kant faced. 
The summum bonum seems to represent Kant's attempt to 
escape from the strict formalism of his fundamental doc-
trines. But Kant gave no proof from the moral law that 
happiness ought to be proportional to virtue. The omis-
sion o£ any such proor is more marked because he based 
morality on Reason alone; for this reason the proof would 
be impossible, because happiness involves feeling. 
1. PL, 140. 3. RQ, 235. 
2. PL, 17. 4. PL, 123. 
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Kant appears to assume that happiness is good if 
united with virtue. Thus moral excellence, regarded as 
a quality of will, becomes a subordinate (though still 
an essential) element in the hi ghest good (summum bonum); 
the satisfaction of desires and feelings is found to be 
also essential; and the moral law remains binding only 
because God rewards those who obey it. Therefore, one 
must conclude that obedience to a universal abstract 
law, without any reference to concrete ends, is no longer 
the sole basis of obligation; it is not the supreme end, 
but only a part of that end. But this view is inconsist-
ent with Kant's starting point. His primary doctrine is 
that obedience to the law is unconditionally good apart 
from its effects; but later, he asserted that the highest 
end must include happiness, and receives part of its 
worth from the satisfaction of desires and feelings. This 
inconsistency arises from Kant's abstraction of duty from 
the well-being of man. Kant argued that so long as happi-
ness is ignored and virtue alone is pursued happiness will 
ultimately be attained. But either happiness is a worthy 
object of pursuit (or, as Mill would say, the only object 
of pursuit) and hence should be incorporated into the orig-
inal and direct end, or happiness is not a worthy object 
of pursuit in which case virtue cannot be improved by any 
reward. 
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As a matter of fact the end of action was wholly 
secondary in Royce's early view. The principal concern 
was to be loyal. He says: "Decide, knowingly if you 
can, ignorantly if you must, but in any case decide, and 
1 have no fear." 
He developed his philosophy of loyalty by adding 
the stipulation that: "In choosing and in serving the 
cause to which you are to be loyal, be, in any case, 
2 loyal to loyalty." This condition does not add very 
much by way of an end to ethical action, but, by impli-
cation, it does bring in considerations of a cause as an 
object of loyalty. He interprets this cause as a "tie."3 
"So far as in me lies," he says, "I will be loyal to our 
tie, to~ cause, to our union. 114 
In the philosophy of the community Royce redefines 
loyalty in such a way as to add more definiteness to the 
object of our loyalty. He says, "by loyalty I mean the 
5 practically devoted love of an individual for a connnuni ty." 
Loyalty came to be regarded in the later Royce as 
essentially the conscious expression of the vnll to inter-
pret. According to Royce: 
Loyalty to a community of interpretation enters 
into all the other forms of true loyalty. No one 
who loves mankind can find a worthier or more 
1. PL, 189. 4. PL, 226. 
2. PL, 121. 5. POC, I, xvii. 
3. PL, 140. 
significant way to express his love than by 
increasing an~ expressing among men the Will 
to Interpret. 
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This connection, or perhaps identification, of the search 
for truth and the moral life has its roots in Peirce's 
position when he says: 
If a man has a transcendent personal interest 
infinitely outweighing all others, then, upon 
the theory of validity of inference just devel-
oped fthat truth is a product of the long run 
experience of the communitj7, he is devoid of 
all security, and can make no valid inference 
whatever. Vfhat follows? That logic rigidly 
requires, before all else, that no determinate 
fact, nothing which can happen to a man's self, 
should be of more consequence to him than every-
thing else. He who would not sacrifice his own 
soul to save the whole world, is illogical in 
all his inferences, collectively. So the social 
principle is rooted intrinsically in logic.2 
Since loyalty is basically inseparable from inter-
pretation, loyalty to the community becomes at once an 
enlightened process. Since rational coherence of one's 
will is at the very center of the will to interpret,it 
does not need to be added as an external and logically for-
eign element as was the case in the earlier Royce. Loyalty 
to the community as the vdll to interpret means that through-
out the process a successful mediating principle be sought 
for. 
Loyalty to the community makes an advance over his 
previous view by being more concrete and by giving more 
1. POC, II, 218. 
2. Peirce, CP, V, 220-221. 
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consideration to the individual as an ethical end. 
Since the community is in part the ideal self-
extension of the individual member, his service to the 
community is essentially a process of contributing to 
his own true self. In this way Royce solves the ethical 
demand that one's duty must somehow be based on the con-
dition that he will experience value as a result of his 
action. This demand could be said to be the element of 
truth contained in egoism. To regard a person as a means 
only must be regarded as unethical and any duty based on 
such a principle is not morally justified. Royce's 
earlier more formalistic ethics failed to give due con-
sider ation to the individual as a moral end. 
Loyalty to the community is thus Royce's contri-
bution to the 11 ego-al ter" problem. The spiritual u...l'li ty 
which is the product of the loyal will to interpret 
resolves the conflict between selfishness and altruism, 
for 
in the love of the community the individual 
obtains for his ideally extended self, pre-
cisely the unity, the wealth, and the harmony 
of plan which hts sundered natural existence 
never supplies. 
One's momentary self is divisive; one's true self 
is inclusive of a great deal of the true self of others. 
1. POC, II, 99-100. 
When one is loyal to one's sel~ or to another person's 
larger self he is at once serving both himsel~ and 
others. According to Royce: 
Such love--such loyalty--depends not upon 
losing sight of the variety of callings of 
individuals, but upon seeing in the suc-
cessful co-operation of all the members 
precisely that event which the individual 
membel most eagerly loves as his own fulfil-
ment. 
Essentially the ethical result of Royce's ethics is meant 
to be selr-realization. 
Although Royce's later ethics is more concrete, the 
question may still be asked whether it is sufficiently 
de~initive to be a guide in practical ethical situations. 
It probably is not. But it is practically impossible to 
set up an ethical system which will apply to all situations 
and still be definitive in particular cases. The logical 
law that intension is in inverse ratio to extension is 
applicable here. Not much could be said about the class 
dog. Much more could be said about a particular dog, 
but very little detailed information could be given about 
a partictuar dog which would help one in his knowledge of 
other dogs. So it is with ethical universals. 
The essential problem here is again that of rela-
ting or mediating the universal to the particular, or the 
1. POC, 99-100. 
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ideal to the actual. Royce tries to solve this problem 
through the finite community. The function of the finite 
community here is to mediate and interpret the estrange-
ments and bring the lives of members into an actuali-
zation of a coherent ideal. 
It is interesting to note that J. B. Pratt in his 
recent book, Reason in the Art of Living, defines the 
moral ideal in a way very similar to that of Royce. 
(Though his "interlocking personalities" are not identi-
cal with Royce's finite communities, they represent Royce's 
ideal.) 
The summum bonum may well be pictured in some such 
all-inclusive society made up of interlocking per-
sonalities--beings each of whom had fought free of 
moral provincialism, and each of whom had unified 
his life round the one dominating principle of the 
service of humanity, a principle which each one 
shared with all the rest. 
Proceeding with the idea that the "highest good" is not 
to be found in economic welfare nor pleasant feeling, he 
goes on to say: 
The preponderating factor in the ideal society 
is rather to be sought for in the moral nature 
of its members and in their clo~e interconnection, 
cooperation, and sympathy ••• 
He concludes that what we need is: 
to build up a society whose members are linked 
together by a rationality so spontaneous that it 
1. Pratt, RAL, 249. 
2. Pratt, RAL, 249. 
can best be described by the word love ••• 
This, then, is the supreme ideal of the ethi-
cal philoso£hY which this volume has sought 
to present. 
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Thus Pratt comes to conclusions strikingly similar 
to those of Royce. Pratt's "interlocking personalities" 
sounds like an echo of Royce's finite communities. 
3. Provincial loyalty and the finite community. 
Royce applies his view of the community to the polit-
ical reAlm. In Royce's very early period he tended to iden-
tify the social order with the political community and felt 
that the state prorllsed the possibility of personal salva-
tion. In Royce's experiences in the lawless frontier life 
of California he felt the great need for law, order and 
a strong government that would enforce these values. In 
one of his earliest books California he writes in Hegel-
ian fashion: 
It is the state, the social order that is 
divine •• • , if we turn again and serve the 
social order we find that what we are serving 
is simply our own highest spiritual destiny 
in bodily form.2 
Royce regarded the strife in political and economic 
relationships as being a source of social development. 
However he differed from Kant who regarded strife as the 
main source of human reasonableness by insisting that, 
1. Pratt, RAL, 249. 
2. CAL, 501. 
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rather than the main source of justice, it was the 
condition for it. Royce's point is that conflict pres-
ents problems, the only solution for which is found "when 
a loyalty takes the place of this natural turbulence."1 
The early Royce held that crises and tragedies are found 
to be simply outward symptoms of the "past crimes of dis-
loyalty to the social order • n2 • • 
In his latest view he still says ttwe are saved 
through the community. 113 But here he no longer thinks of 
it as identical with the political community but rather 
the Universal Community. And so he says, "the community 
of mankind as total community is my highest interest. 114 
Royce tried to solve the political problem by 
treating it in the light of the· process of interpretation. 
The two members of a conflict whether nations or parties 
to economic competition were to have a mediator who would 
be the insurer of peace. This mediator's function, how-
ever, was not so much to interpret the differences as to 
preserve peace by an artificial device of making :conflict 
uneconomical. Through such restraint he believed nations 
would gradually be required to have a conscience and a 
definite loyalty to the community of nations. 5 Banking 
1. WAR, 85. 4. HGC, 14. 
2. CAL, 277-278. 5. WAR, 94. 
3. HGC, 131. 
with its credit system he felt was 11both a result of 
loyalty and a trainer of loyalty."l 
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Royce in his later thought tried to preserve a 
pluralism in his social organicism by insisting on the 
provincial approach or what may be called a grass roots 
loyalty. He insisted that national loyalty or loyalty 
to the world community depended upon provincial loyalty. 2 
Without continued loyalty to the ties close at hand the 
more universal loyalties could not be sustained. The 
point he emphasizes is that the finite community is a 
threshold to larger loyalties and ultimately to the real-
ization of the hope of the Great Community. 
A clarification of what the finite community is 
not must be made. Once the finite community is created it 
is capable of setting ideal goals for the loyal members. 
The finite community is called a "social mind" by Royce. 
But this term is misleading because of the connotations 
popularly attached to the term. It is neither a collection 
of minds nor the collective opinion of a social group. 
The criticism that the social mind is not worthy of 
ideal loyalty because its goals would be synonymous with 
the collective opinions of the majority misreads Royce's 
view. There is a failure here to distinguish properly 
1. WAR, 60. 
2. PL, 247. 
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between the social mind as a collective entity and as 
an objective personalized being. Royce insists that his 
social mind is not like a mob mind. One important dis-
tinction is that his social mind has a history and a 
planned future. The unique character of the community 
appears at this point. It can constitute ideal goals 
because its ideals are synoptically related to the Com-
munity of Interpretation. 
It is true that the opinion of the majority is 
probably inferior to the insights of some persons who 
constitute a minority, and it is true that it is often 
second best to follow the majority, to say nothing of 
being loyal to it. 
It is also probably true that the masses ordinar-
ily, at least in their present state of enlightenment, 
do not reflect their needs in their desires nor their 
ideal values in their value claims. 
But Royce is not subject properly to this criti-
cism. The community interprets the conflicts and the con-
trasts within the community and does not merely reflect 
the thesis or antithesis represented by the greatest 
nun1erical strength. It has been shown that Royce regards 
the community of Interpretation as based logically on an 
objective order system which is therefore an aspect of 
the divine nature. The finite communities, then, should 
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be regarded as the interaction of individuals within 
the framework of a logical order system or the mental 
expression of the World Interpreter. 
Our relation to this order system is voluntary 
within the framework of Royce's view of Absolute Prag-
matism. 
4. The religious basis of the community. 
Royce holds that even though there is a close 
connection between ethical and religious ideas, a con-
trast may be made. "Ethical ideas,'' according to Royce, 
"define the nature of righteous conduct," whereas, "reli-
gious ideas have to do with bringing us into union with 
some supremely valua.ble form or level of life. 111 Moral-
ity helps direct us to our duty, whereas religion tries 
to show us some way of salvation. Ethical teachings, he 
points out, show us a better way of living. Religion, 
on the other hand, 
undertakes to lead us to a home-land where we 
may witness, and if we are successful, may 
share some supreme 2fulfilment of the purpose for which we live. 
Royce's latest views of religion are expressed in 
terms of the Christian religion which he reinterprets in 
terms of his doctrine of the community. As thus viewed, 
1. POC, I, 327. 
2. POC, I, 327. 
the essential and vital features of Christianity are 
harmonious with his philosophy of the community. 
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Christianity, according to Royce, 1 was the product 
of extensive processes of religious evolution. It was a 
redemptive religion, which condemned the mind and the 
sins of the "natural" man, assuming, as it did, that the 
very essence of the hmnan self is, prior to the saving 
process, a necessary source of misery and evil. It is 
an important element of Royce's thought that the indi-
vidual human being is "subject to some overwhelming 
moral burden from which, if unaided, he cannot escape. 112 
\llthen "rightly interpreted" he feels that this moral bur-
den is not only an "essential feature 11 of Christianity, 
but "an indispensable part of every religious and moral 
view of life. 113 
In harmony with Royce's departure from his earlier 
Calvinistic tendencies, Royce rejects the notion that man 
is sinful by nattwe. He believes, rather, that at birth 
man has only untrained instinctive predispositions, which 
may, under training, turn out well or badly, but which, 
. 4 
until training turns them into conduct, are 11innocent." 
This moral burden, from which Royce believes man 
must be saved, is a product of social training. His 
1. POC, I, 332-335. 3. POC, I, 121. 
2. POC, I, 111. 4. POC, I, 148-149. 
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argument is as follows: 
Man is awakened out of his "natural unconscious-
ness" about his ovm conduct and comes to more and more 
complex types of self-consciousness through the various 
forms of social interaction, especially those involving 
1 
social interference and conflict. The comparison and 
contrast involved in social interaction lead us to see 
ourselves as on the one side and the social will ("the 
law") on the opposing side. The more aware a person is, 
then, of the social will, the more highly conscious of 
himself he becomes. This is a reciprocal process, for 
the better one knows himself, the more clearly he esti-
mates the "dignity and the authority of the social will." 2 
11 Upon the chaos of these social contrasts," Royce says, 
"my whole later training in the knowledge of the good 
and the evil of my ovm conduct is founded. n3 As a mat-
tar of fact man's moral self is built upon the founds-
tiona of the troubled social life that he must lead. 
He cannot escape nor does he really want to escape the 
social will because he is a social animal and needs the 
security of this external authority as the only alter-
native to chaos. In Royce's words: 
For, if I indeed am intelligent, I also 
learn that, in a highly cultivated civili-
1. POC, I, 132. 
2. POC, I, 134. 
3. POC, I, 137. 
zation, the social will is mighty, and daily 
grows mightier, and must ordinarily and £ut-
wardly, prevail unless chaos is to come. 
132. 
A person not only wants to be confronted with the disci-
pline of the social will in order to escape anarchy, but 
may also, if he is sensitive, feel the importance of the 
social forces and want them to become more powerful so 
2 that they may be used by the individual himself. 
But for the most part, according to Royce, the indi-
vidual reacts to this external authority in a mood of active 
rebellion with intensified self-will. He becomes "an indi-
vidualist among mutually hostile individualists, a citi-
zen of a world where all are consciously free to think ill 
of one another • • • He thus finds himself in a divided 
state and the more he struggles to escape through his moral 
cultivation, the more he sees his divided state. The 
result is a feeling of distraction and inner despair. 
This conflict between the feeling of one's own inal-
ienable rights and the need to submit to the collective 
will is conwon to humanity as a social race. The rebel-
lion is not due, Royce concludes, to any instinct but to 
the very conditions to which the development of sel~-con-
4 
sciousness is subject. The individual is trained by a 
process which taints his conscience with the sin of self-
1. POC, I, 150. 3. POC, I, 150. 
2. POC, I, 153. 4. POC, I, 155. 
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will, of clever hostility to the very social order upon 
1 
which he more and more consciously depends. 
This self-will, constituting man's moral burden, 
finds the solution for its plight in a loyalty to the com-
munity, which is 11 the love of a community conceived as a 
person on a level superior to that of any human individual. 112 
This loyalty, through the miracle of love, results in a 
new type of self-consciousness which transplants or over-
comes that which is fostered by social training. In the 
words of Royce: 
Love that community; let its spirit, through 
this love, become your own. Let its Lord be 
your Lord. Be one in him and with him and with 
his Church. And lol the natural self is dead. 
The new life takes possession of you. You are 
a new creature. The law has no dominion over 
you. In the universal community you live in 
the spirit; and hence for the only self, the 
only self-consciousness, the only knowledge of 
your own deeds which you possess or tolerate: 
these are one wit~ the spirit of the Lord and 
of the community. 
Royce believes this account is the essence of Paul's 
views. But, apart from Paul's religious faith, he insists 
it is securely grounded in human experience. "Loyalty," 
he says, 
is the only cure for the natural warfare of the 
collective and of the individual will,--a war-
fare which no moral cultivation without loyalty 
can ever end, but which all cultivation, apart 
from such devoted and transforming love4of the co~nunity, only inflames and increases. 
1. POC, I, 157. 3. POC, I, 158. 
2. POC, I, 159. 4. POC, I, 159. 
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5. The contrast in Royce's development in religious thought. 
There is a contrast in the later Royce's religious 
thought between theistic humanism on the one hand and the 
concept of the immortal Beloved Community on the other 
hand. Whereas it is not uncommon for person-affirming 
philosophies to include doctrines of personal immortality, 
the usual tendency in humanist circles is to emphasize 
social immortality rather than the faith in an other-
worldly heaven and personal immortality. Both tendencies 
in Royce, however, are consistent with the thesis of this 
dissertation since they both tend in the direction from 
the abstract to the concrete. 
i. Theistic huma1nsm. 
The movement in Royce's philosophy of the community 
away from an other-worldly absolute theism toward a this-
worldly theistic humanism took many forms. 
Royce, in his later philosophy, as has been shown, 
tended away from the Calvinistic disparagement of man and 
toward the exalting of him and his potentialities. A 
sharp contrast is apparent between his earliest and his 
latest thought. In an entry in his diary in 1879 he wrote, 
11 I am thinking and writing face to face with a mighty and 
lovely Nature, by the side of whose greatness I am but as 
a worm. 111 But in The Problem of Christianity he said, 
1. FE, 7. 
"Full of wonders is nature. But the most wonderful of 
all is man the interpreter •• 111 
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It is true that Royce in his latest thought dis-
paraged the unextended or uninterpreted life. A man as 
a ~ individual is the basis, for Royce, of all moral 
evil. 2 The tendency to such non-social thought and 
activity is due to his natural tendencies. But as has 
been shown, when he mingles with society and thus devel-
ops his self-consciousness he also experiences an increase 
of self-will. 3 Social life, then, by intensifying self-
will adds to man's burden, which is isolation from the 
connnunity. 4 
Royce insists, as a central feature of his doc-
trine of the Community, that moral evil must be atoned 
for by the Beloved Community and that man's only means of 
salvation is through membership in and devotion to this 
Cmmnuni ty. "We are saved," he said, 11if at all, by devo-
5 tion to the Community." We cannot save ourselves; we 
are dependent upon our religious community. This, so 
far, is in the direction of humanism, since the emphasis 
is definitely on the individual's dependence for salva-
tion on his social group and not on a metaphysical God. 
1. POC, II, 418. 
2. POC, I, 178. 
3. POC, I, 145. 
4. POC, I, 176. 
5. POC, I, xvii. 
cf. I, xvi, xix, xx, 
xxv. 
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In The Sources of Religious Insight he brought the point 
out clearly when he said, 11 Normally the way to salvation, 
if there be any such way, must lead through social expe-
rience. nl Again, he said, "The redeeming divine spirit 
- 2 
that saves men dwells in the Church." 
The function of religion, then, is not only to 
provide salvation through the Beloved Community, but also 
to realize social ideals of brotherhood and to enlarge the 
social conscience of its members. Royce speaks of the 
disloyal 11 traitor 11 who "destroyed by his deed the commu-
nity in whose brotherhood, in whose spirit, he had found 
his guide and ideal. 11 3 
Another function of religion is to bring the 
"Beloved Community into visible existence, to create the 
Kingdom of Heaven on earth. 114 Royce said, 11 the office of 
religion is to aim towards the creation on earth of the 
Beloved Connnunity."5 He criticizes the churches for fail-
ing to do more in the direction of accomplishing this goa1. 6 
Another huraanistic strain in Royce is his lack of 
emphasis on the distinction between the secular and the 
divine. Nothing human struggling upward is alien to the 
religious life, for Royce. "All the higher forms or· loy-
alty," he says, "are, in their spirit, religious. 117 He 
1. SRI, 75. 5. POC, II, 430. 
2. POC, II, 363. 6. POC, II, 371. 
3. POC, I, 294. 7. POC, I, 193 • 
. 4. POC, I, xviii. 
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concludes his views on the Christian churches by giving 
them a "practical maxim": "Simplify your traditional 
Christology, in order thereby to enrich its spirit. The 
religion of loyalty has shown us the way to this end."l 
In his glorification of science, which has already 
been pointed out, and in his love for the scientific 
spirit, 2 he indicates again a tendency in common with 
humanists. Royce seems to be at home with nature and 
feels an optimism in man's ability to understand and con-
3 trol nature in the service of man. 
The present existence, then, and the rapid 
progress of the inductive sciences, have been 
rendered possible by an instinctive aptitude 
of the human mind to shorten the labors of 
testing hypothesis through some sort of native 
skill in the invention of hypotheses such as 
are capable of bearing the test of experience. 4 
Royce's praise of the scientific community of interpre-
tation as the highest form of community, as the one most 
nearly like the Community of Interpretation, and as an 
"organ of religion"5 is definitely humanistic in character. 
In general, the trend in The Problem of Christian-
--- . - . 
ity is toward an increased appreciation of the humanist 
position. However, it was not atheistic humanism toward 
which he tended. 
He ins is ted, for example, that "natural science can 
1. POC, II, 424. 4. POC, II, 414. 
2. POC, II, 432. 5. POC, II, 431. 
3. POC, II, 411-414. 
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1 
never displace religion or do its work" and that there 
is "a connection between philosophical idealism and 
natural science." 2 He also did not believe in a "wor-
ship of the mere natural being called humanity. 113 Fur-
thermore, it has already been shown that Royce believes 
in a personal God in the form of the World Interpreter 
or the Spirit of the Community and re_gard~ him · as both 
transcendent and i~nanent. 
ii. The i~ortal Beloved Community. 
In sharp contrast to the tendency of Royce toward 
a ppreciating the position of hmnanism is his concept of 
the i~ortal Beloved Community. 
The Beloved or Universal Community was, for Royce, 
the ideal goal of all striving. 
God's love towards the individual is, from the 
Christian point of view, a love for one whose 
destiny is to be a member of the Kingdom of 
Heaven. The4Kingdom of Heaven is essentially a c onnnuni ty. 
It has been shown that, according to Royce, the 
individual must retain his identity in the community in 
order to maintain the life of the community. With this 
established, Royce is prepared to offer in his latest 
philosophy of the community a doctrine of personal 
1, POC, II, 430. 
2. POC, II, 393. 
3. POC, II, 429. 
4. P OC, I , 34 2. 
immortality. 
To this community LBeloved Communitj7 in ideal 
all men belong ; and to act as if one were a 
member of such a community is to win in the 1 highest measure the goal of individual life. 
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The trend in Royce is from an Absolutistic and 
other-worldly theism to a humanistic and this-worldly 
theism on the one hand. On the other hand there is also 
a trend in Royce away from pantheistic immortality in 
which the individual fragmentary person is merged in the 
Absolute toward an immortality in the Beloved Community 
in which the individual is preserved eternally. Yet in 
both trends the yearning in Royce remains the same. It 
is for concreteness. Even as theistic humanism is more 
concrete in its concern for the individual than absolute 
theism, so is the Beloved Community more concrete in its 
preservation of the individual than is the Absolute of 
the early Royce. 
1. POC, I, 73. 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION AND ESTI~~TE 
'fhe conclusions to which this investigation has led 
are as follows : 
'l'here was sufficient change in Royce's development 
in the direction of providing for the integrity of the 
individual so that his latest philosophic system based on 
the concept of the "Community'' woul d best be described as 
a personalistic organic pluralism. 
This general conclusion was justified on the basis 
of further specific conclusions as follows: 
First, "Interpretation," the method of know i ng 
derived from Peirce and developed by Royce, is essentially 
dualis tic in epistemology and thus guarantees determin-
ateness in the world. God, as the Interpreter of the world , 
does not become identical with the world in his act of know-
ing it. God's knowledge of the world is epistemically dual-
istic . His knowledge of the world as an expression of his 
purpose takes the fo rm of dualis tic "self- knowledge" rather 
than monistic "self-experience . " 
Second, value theo ry was given a more concrete place, 
especially with reference to the creation and conservation 
of the value experienc es of the individual selve s . A fac -
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tor in this was the concept of the finite community of 
interpretation which constituted creators and conservers 
of value experience in the dialectical process. 
Third, his philosophy exhibits increased empiricism 
with its emphasis on the centrality of time, evolutionary 
development, and the importance of active contributions 
by individuals. He shows increased interest in science 
and exalts the scientific community as a model for his 
Universal Community. 
Fourth, Royce grants greater powers and responsi-
bilities to the individual. The individual can perform 
the functions of a community in discovering truth and in 
creating value. God works through the individual in the 
realization of his eternal goal. But the individual is 
not coerced. God must win the loyalty of the individual 
to his cause. 
Fifth, Royce grants more importance to personality 
and thus makes a contribution to the solution of the prob-
lem of relating the actual and the ideal in all its forms. 
All activity and loci of value are individual persons. 
They are universalizing particulars. 
Sixth, self-interpretation or self-realization as 
a basis for the world's dialectical process is also a basis 
for his ethics. Royce's ethical ideal of loyalty to the 
community provides a metaphysical support to his ethics, 
' · 
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overcomes largely his earlier formalism, and tends more 
to acknowledge the individual's need of self-realization. 
He has softened the conflict of individual versus society 
on a basis that provides for more recognition of the indi-
vidual as an end. 
Seventh, his view of God as the Interpreter and as 
the Beloved Community emphasizes God's immanence and his 
redemptive power on a level closer to the area of the 
individual's personal and social values~ 
Royce's latest philosophic system, attempting as 
it did to mediate between absolute idealism and pragmatism 
offers contributions which are important today in solving 
the philosophic problem of the individual's relation to 
society and to the world. The world is in need today of 
some form of a "Great Community. " 
It has been shown that Royce's philosophy underwent 
such changes that the historical stereotyping of him as an 
absolute idealist throughout his life is unwarranted. 
We come now to an estimate of his contribution, i.e. 
brief comments on the accuracy of Royce's perception of the 
philosophic data or problem and the veridity of his inter-
pretations or solutions. In other words, how do Royce's 
views correspond to the life situation with which he attempts 
to deal? 
1 
It was suggested previously that Royce's emphasis 
upon the community was related to his own personal inad-
equacies. It may be argued that views may be true or 
false irrespective of any conscious or unconscious motiva-
tions on the part of their proponent. However, Royce laid 
claim to an accurate analysis of the human self and in 
fact any inteiligent human race . After i nterpreting the 
problem as he saw it, he judged whether the interpreta-
tion was satisfying to him or, in other words, solved 
the problem as he saw it. This is, of course, true of 
all philosophizing. However, everything but the i nter-
pretation is observation. It becomes relevant, therefore, 
to inquire as to the ability of the observer to be accurate 
in his observation. 
2 
A survey of Royce's own comments on his psyc ho-
logical development will reveal a possible clue to his 
failure adequately to describe the human self. He reveals 
an excessive family control fostering a need for dependence 
and a t t he same time a smouldering rebellion. His repressed 
hostility arising from the violent rejection by his fellows 
lay at the basis of his apparent basic distrus t in a nd 
lack of personal love fo r individual persons . The "moral 
burdenn of self-will, which he wrongly ascribes to all 
people, he reveals in himself when he says: 
So much of the spirit that opp oses the community 
I have and have always had in me, simple, ele-
mentally , deeply. Over against this natural 
1. Supra , 16. 
2. HGC, 122-136. 
ineffectiveness in serving the cormnunity, and 
over against this rebellion, there has always 
stood the interest which has taught me what I 
now.adays try to express by teaching that we 
are saved through the community.l 
Royce describes the human self as essentially thought, 
will, or purpose, but never in terms of love. as a vital 
feeling relation between persons. Loyalty, which he often calls 
love, is seen to be an abstract intellectual process in 
the form of the will to interpret. It is never a relation 
to an individual. His distrust of personal love is sho\vn 
when he says: 
For human unions can become stable and fruitful 
only through the establishment of relations which 
are very different from the dangerous dyadic 2rela-tions of lovers, of rivals, and of warriors . 
Royce describes the human self inadequately not 
only by neglecting the feelings, but also by regarding 
the "divided self" as necessarily characteristic and 
universal. Apparently seeing no basis in the self for 
security and antonomous dignity and value, Royce finds 
a substitute, first in the individual's identity with 
the Absolute and, finally, in his membership in the 
community . 
A more correct basis for interpersonal relations 
than Royce used would involve starting with the normal 
healthy personality. Accepting each individual as a locus 
1. HGC, lJO-lJl. 
2. 1NAR , 39· 
of his own personal value would encourage an outgoing 
love, which would form the most valuable basis for a 
"Great Community." 
Thus, while the establishment of values by each 
individual may seem to suggest a complete anarchy 
of values, experience indicates that quite the 
opposite is true. Since all individuals have 
basically the same needs, including the need for 
acceptance by others, it appears that when each 
individual formulates his own values, in terms 
of his own direct experience, it is not anarchy 
which results, but a high degree of commonality 
and a genuinely socialized system of values. 
One of the ultimate ends, then, of an hypothesis 
of confidence in the individual, and in his capac-
ity to resolve his own conflicts, is the emergence 
of value systems which are unique and personal for 
each individual, and which are changed by the chang-
ing evidence of organic experience, yet which are 
at the same time deeply socialized, possessing a 
high degree of similarity in their essentials.l 
1. Rogers, CCT, 524. 
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The problem of this dissertation is to investigate 
the changes in Josiah Royce's philosophic development with 
special reference to the bearing of these changes on the 
status of the individual. 
The method adopted in this research was first to 
divide Royce's development into two periods. The earlier 
period is defined as that before his exposition of those 
views that are peculiarly related to the new reorientation 
of his philosophy around the concept of the ttcomrnunity.n 
The later period has explicit expression with the publi-
cation of the Hibbert Lectures as The Problem of Christi-
anity in 1913. 
His philosophic systems as developed in each period 
were contrasted with reference to the features which con-
tributed to an enhancement of the status of the individual 
as f ound in his latest philosophy. The contention is made 
that Royce's latest philosophy has been seriously neglected 
by students of Royce. Conclusions are reached, therefore, 
in the hope of correcting the historical stereotyping of 
Royce on the basis of his earlier period and in the con-
fidence that his later period contains worthwhile contri-
butions for dealing with current philosophical problems. 
The research was based primarily on the writings of 
Royce in order to clarify the contrasts in his earlier and 
later period; a contrast which some of his critics called 
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inconsistency, but which Royce himself called a new growth. 
First, his views of how the individual and the community 
came into being were analyzed. Then, following a description 
of the logical and metaphysical aspects of the individual 
and the co~nunity, the gains for individualism were sho\vn. 
Finally, the meaning of his latest ethical and religious 
concepts were defined in terms of their bearing on the 
increased status of the individual. 
The conclusions to which this investigation has led 
are as follows: 
There was sufficient change in Royce's development 
in the direction of providing for the integrity of the indi-
vidual so that his latest philosophic system based on the 
concept of the "Co~nunity" would best be described as a 
personalistic organic pluralism. 
This general conclusion was justified on the basis 
of further specific conclusions as follows: 
First, "Interpretation," the method of knowing derived 
from Peirce and developed by Royce, is essentially dualistic 
in epistemology and thus guarantees determinateness in the 
world. God, as the Interpreter of the world, does not become 
identical with the world in his act of knowing it. God's 
knowledge of the world is epistemically dualistic. His 
knowledge of the world as an expression of his purpose takes 
the form of dualistic "self-knowledge" rather than monistic 
"self-experience." 
161. 
Second, value theory was given a more concrete place, 
especially with reference to the creation and conservation 
of the value experiences of the individual selves. A factor 
in this was the concept of the finite community of interpre-
tation which constituted creators and conservers of value 
experience in the dialectical process. 
Third, his philosophy exhibits increased empiricism 
with its emphasis on the centrality of time, evolutionary 
development, and the importance of active contributions 
by individuals. He shows increased interest in science 
and exalts the scientific community as a model for his Uni-
versal Co~nunity. 
Fourth, Royce grants greater powers and responsi-
bilities to the individual. The individual can perform the 
functions of a community in discovering truth and in crea-
ting value. God works through the individual in the reali-
za t ion of his eternal goal. But the individual is not 
coerced. God must win the loyalty of the individual to his 
cause. 
Fifth, Royce grants more importance to personality 
and thus makes a contribution to the solution of the problem 
of relating the actual and the ideal in all its forms. All 
activity and loci of value are individual persons. They are 
universalizing particulars. 
Sixth, self-interpretation or self-realization as a 
basis for the world's dialectical process is also a basis 
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for his ethics. Royce's ethical ideal of loyalty to the 
community provides a metaphysical support to his ethics , 
overcomes largely his earlier formalism , and tends more to 
acknowledge the individual ' s need of self- realization . He 
has softened the conflict of individual versus society on 
a basis that provides for more recognition of the individual 
as an end . 
Seventh, his view of God as the In t erpreter and as the 
Beloved Community emphasizes God's immanence and his reder~­
tive power on a level closer to the area of the individual's 
personal and s o cial values . 
Royce's latest philosophic system, attempting as it 
did to mediate between absolute idealism and pragmatism 
offers contributions which are important today in solving 
the philosophic problem of the individual's relation to 
society and to the world. The world is in need today of 
some form of a 11 Great Community . n 
In a concluding estimate , from the standpoint of 
external criticism, it was pointed out that throughout 
Royce's philosophic development he maintained an inadequate 
conception of the self. And, although his later philosophy 
did allow more i ntegrity to the individual , it failed to 
provide a completely satisfactory solution due to his 
163. 
neglect of feelings, particularly love. He describes love 
as an a b stract and intellectual process--as a loyalty to 
groups or as the will to interpret . Nowhere does Royce 
seem to recognize love as a vital feeling relation between 
persons . With a more adequate view of the self, Royce 
could have enriched his views both of the self and the 
community . 
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